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Contribution Among Antitrust Violators: A 
Question of Legal Process 
C. Douglas Floyd* 
The statutory scheme of the federal antitrust laws expressly 
provides for a variety of remedies in both government and pri- 
vate actions, including criminal penalties,' civil actions by the 
United States for injunction and damages,' private actions for 
treble damages and injunctive relief: and actions "parens pa- 
triae" by state attorneys general seeking damages sustained on 
behalf of natural persons residing in the state.' Unlike the fed- 
eral securities acts, however,' the remedial provisions of the an- 
titrust laws contain no authorization for those held liable for 
damages on account of violations of the antitrust laws to seek 
contribution from others who allegedly are jointly liable for the 
same wrong. 
Until recently, the courts had uniformly held or assumed 
that no right to contribution existed under the federal antitrust 
laws? This was in accordance with the long-standing federal 
common law rule announced in Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chi- 
cago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad7 that "one of several 
wrongdoers cannot recover against another wrongdoer, although 
he may have been compelled to pay all the damages for the 
wrong done.'" But in 1979, antitrust defendants, inspired in part 
by what they perceived as a growing "trend" in the federal 
* B.S., 1964, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; LL.B., 1967, Stanford Univer- 
sity School of Law. Visiting Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
Brigham Young University. 
1. 15 U.S.C. QQ 1, 2 (1976). 
2. Id. QQ 15(a), 25. 
3. Id. §Q 15, 26. 
4. Id. Q 15~-15h. 
5. Id. $5 77k(f), 78i(e), 78r(b). 
6. See, e.g., El Camino Glass v. Sunglow Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 772,110 (N.D. 
Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 
1343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Schubert, 276 F.2d 614, 616-17 (3d Cir. 1960) 
(dictum). 
7. 196 U.S. 217 (1905). 
8. Id. at  224. 
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courts toward allowing contribution among defendants in a vari- 
ety of contexts, made new efforts to establish a right to contri- 
bution under the antitrust laws as a matter of federal common 
law. These efforts resulted in conflicting decisions on the ques- 
tion in the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, and a renewal of 
scholarly criticism and interest.@ 
By virtue of the grant of certiorari to review the Fifth Cir- 
cuit's decision in Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. 
Texas Industries, Inc.,1° which declined to create a new federal 
common-law right of antitrust contribution, this important 
question of legal process and judicial administration is now des- 
tined for decision by the United States Supreme Court. It is the 
thesis of this Article, contrary to the general view of the com- 
mentary to date, that when that Court does have occasion to 
hear and decide the issue, it should reaffirm the long-standing 
rule that there is no common-law right of contribution under the 
federal antitrust laws. It should do so because the considerations 
of equity and fairness that constitute the primary basis for a 
contribution right are far less compelling in the context of price- 
fixing and other conspiratorial violations of the antitrust laws 
than in the cases of negligence and strict liability in tort, where 
such rights have previously been recognized (primarily by legis- 
lative enactment). Of equal importance, the creation of a right of 
contribution could so impair the policies of deterrence and com- 
pensation underlying the scheme of private antitrust remedies 
enacted by the Congress that only a far clearer showing of injus- 
tice than has yet been forthcoming would support the intrusion 
of the judiciary into the sphere of distribution of damages in an- 
9. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 
1979); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 
(8th Cir. 1979); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 71 76,699 
(10th Cir. 1979) (petition for rehearing en banc granted Dec. 27, 1979). See generally 
Littman & Van Buskirk, The "Dogmas" of Antitrust Actions: A New Perspective, 24 
ANTITRUST BULL. 687 (1979); Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in Private Ac- 
tions Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 33 S.W.L.J. 779 (1979); Note, Contribution in 
Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL . REV. 682 (1978); Note, Contribution in Private 
Antitrust Actions, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1540 (1980); Note, Contribution Among Private 
Antitrust Conspirators, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 342 (1980). For earlier commentary, see 
Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Contribution Among Coconspirators in Anti- 
trust Treble Damage Actions, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1962); Paul, Contribution and 
Indemnification Among Antitrust Coconspirators Revisited, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 67 
(1972). 
10. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Rad- 
c l 8 e  Materials, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (Od. 31, 1980). 
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titrust cases, which has to date been the province of the legisla- 
tive branch. 
In Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. u. National Beauty 
Supply, Inc.,ll the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit became the first federal court to recognize a right 
of contribution among antitrust violators. Professional, a whole- 
saler of beauty supplies, alleged that National, another whole- 
saler, had induced Professional's manufacturer-supplier, La 
Maur, Inc., to terminate its relationship with Professional and 
grant National an exclusive dealership for La Maur's products in 
Minnesota. National's conduct was alleged to constitute a mo- 
nopolization or an attempt to monopolize in violation of section 
2 of the Sherman Act." National filed a third-party complaint 
against La Maur alleging that La Maur had solicited National to 
become a distributor of La Maur's products, and that in the 
event National were held liable to Professional, it would be enti- 
tled to contribution from La Maur for at  least one-half of any 
ultimate recovery. The district court granted La M a d s  motion 
to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. 
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the 
third-party complaint. A majority of the panel held "that under 
certain circumstances an antitrust defendant may be entitled to 
pro rata contribution from other joint tortfeasors."lS The major- 
ity reviewed at length the various policy reasons that have been 
advanced in opposition to the judicial creation of a right of con- 
tribution under the antitrust laws1' and concluded that none of 
these arguments outweighed what the court viewed as the dis- 
positive factor: "The deciding factor in our decision is fairness 
between the parties. We conclude that fairness requires that the 
right of contribution exist among joint tortfeasors at  least under 
11. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979). 
12. Id. at 1181. Professional also asserted pendent state-law claims. 
13. Id. at 1182 (footnotes omitted). 
14. These policy reasons included, among others, the question of congressional in- 
tent, the danger of unduly complicating antitrust litigation, the fear of deterring settle- 
ments under the antitrust laws, and the diminution of the deterrent effect of the private 
treble damages remedy. 
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certain circumstances. "I6 
In Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas Indus- 
tries, Inc.,16 a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit reached the op- 
posite conclusion. The Fifth Circuit majority believed that judi- 
cial recognition of a right of contribution among antitrust 
violators, particularly intentional violators, might frustrate the 
deterrent effect of the antitrust laws by unduly complicating an- 
titrust litigation and by permitting a violator to spread his losses 
among a large number of defendants.17 The majority reasoned 
that "a rule prohibiting contribution among antitrust coconspir- 
ators not only does not frustrate deterrence but may very well 
enhance the statutes' deterrent effect by preventing a defendant 
from cutting its losses,"18 and that judicial recognition of a right 
of contribution "may open a Pandora's box of procedural 
problems, against which district court discretion may prove a 
palliation.'"@ Although the court recognized "reasonable con- 
trary arguments" it concluded: 
In this area of interstitial lawmaking, however, to forge a 
new rule with questionable benefits and such possible detri- 
ments is a bad practice. Those aggrieved by this decision al- 
ways have recourse to Congress, a forum better suited to evalu- 
ation of the competing interests and policies involved.40 
In Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract C O . , ~ ~  a different Fifth 
Circuit panel applied that circuit's Abraham Construction deci- 
sion to deny any right of contribution in favor of nonsettling de- 
fendants against other defendants in the same action who had 
settled the plaintiffs' claims against them. 
Finally, in Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, I ~ c . , ~ ~  the 
Tenth Circuit, in yet another divided panel opinion, concluded 
with respect to the competing policies involved: "[IJt can be seen 
that there are strong offsetting arguments over the contribution 
issue. We regard as mere speculation the forecast that, if the 
15. 594 F.2d at 1185. 
16. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979). 
17. Id. at 900-05. In Abraturrn Construction, the defendants, alleged price-fixers, 
sought to file third party complaints against alleged coconspirators not named as 
defendants. 
18. Id. at 903 (footnote omitted). 
19. Id. at 906. 
20. Id. 
21. No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979) (unpublished opinion), cert. granted, 100 S. 
Ct. 3008 (1980), cert. dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3288 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
22. 1979-2 Trade Cas. 8 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979). 
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question were presented, Congress would include a right to con- 
tribution as part of the antitrust laws."23 The majority reasoned 
that questions regarding the effect such a new right would have 
on the workability and fairness of the statutory private treble 
damage remedy were not suited to judicial resolution: 
Before entering such a complex policy thicket, but recog- 
nizing a possible exception in the case of an unintentional vio- 
lator, we believe this court should await a clear signal, at least, 
from the legislative branch of our government on the matter. 
Certainly, the Congress, assisted by the resources of the execu- 
tive branch, is in a far superior and more appropriate position 
to gauge the impact on observance and enforcement of the an- 
titrust laws from contribution and its various facets of 
implernentati~n.~~ 
On June 16,1980, the United States Supeme Court granted 
certiorari in the Fifth Circuit Westvaco case, presumably for the 
purpose of resolving the conflict in the circuits.25 The question 
presented by the petition for certiorari was "[wlhether defen- 
dants in antitrust cases may assert rights of contrib~tion."~~ The 
petitioners in Westvaco were three of thirty-seven corrugated 
container manufacturers who were named defendants in consoli- 
dated class-action antitrust treble damage complaints alleging a 
nationwide conspiracy to fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize the 
23. Id. at 79,703. 
24. Id. at 79,703-04 (footnote omitted). In the Olson Farms case, Olson, was sued by 
fourteen egg producers which alleged that it had engaged in a conspiracy to fix the prices 
paid the producers for their eggs at  an artificially low level in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, and that it had conspired to monopolize the distribution of eggs in viola- 
tion of section 2 of that act. Olson Farms' alleged conspirators were not identified by the 
complaint, but the evidence at  trial tended to establish that some ninety percent of the 
sales of eggs for which damages were sought from Olson had not been sales to Olson, but 
had been sales to the other alleged conspirators. Id. at  79,700. Unlike the defendants in 
the Professional Beauty Supply and Abraham Construction cases, Olson made no effort 
to file third party complaints against the other alleged conspirators in the original anti- 
trust action, but proceeded to trial alone. The jury returned a verdict against Olson 
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and assessed damages, which, after trebling, 
amounted to almost $2 million. The decision was later affirmed by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 
F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976). In Olson Farms, it was only after the entry of judgment on the 
jury verdict against it in the original antitrust case that Olson determined to seek contri- 
bution through an independent action in the United States District Court for the Dis- 
trict of Utah against five asserted coconspirators on account of whose purchases of eggs 
damages had allegedly been assessed against Olson in the first trial. 
25. 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980). 
26. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at  2, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 100 S. 
Ct. 3008 (1980). 
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prices of corrugated containers and sheets." Certain class repre- 
sentatives estimated treble damages to be as high as $5.9 billion. 
Following certification, more than twenty of the defendants set- 
tled plaintiffs' claims against them for sums aggregating in ex- 
cess of $300 million. The three petitioners in the Westuaco case, 
however, did not settle. Faced with joint and several liability al- 
leged to be in excess of five billion dollars, they instead sought 
to file contribution cross-claims against the settling defendants, 
together with an affirmative defense alleging that plaintiffs' 
claim should be reduced in an amount fairly allocable to the set- 
tling defendants' conduct ("claim reduction")? The district 
court denied the motions to assert contribution cross-claims and 
claim reduction defenses. The court of appeals affirmed as to 
contribution, but held that the order with respect to petitioners' 
claim reduction defense was not immediately appealable because 
no Rule 54(b) certificate had been entered with respect to it. 
The petition for certiorari was based on petitioners' claim 
that they faced "unfair settlement coercion" as a result of their 
exposure to joint and several liability for the entire damages to 
the class. They claimed that "the pressures created by the enor- 
mous damage exposure resulted in an unprecedented five-week 
settlement 'stampede' " and that "with each successive settle- 
ment during the stampede, plaintiffs demanded and received 
amounts at a higher rate than prior settlements without regard 
to the merits of their claims. . . . Plaintiffs were able to escalate 
their settlement demands because in the absence of contribution 
the exposure faced by each nonsettling defendant is increased 
with each successive ~ettlernent."~~ 
The grant of certiorari in the Westuaco case was peculiar. 
Virtually all authorities are now in agreement that it is inappro- 
priate to allow contribution against a settling defendant even 
under statutes expressly providing for a right of contribution. 
Although the Westuaco petitioners could have made a substan- 
tial argument with respect to their defense of claim reduction on 
account of the settlements, that issue was not before the Su- 
preme Court since it was not subject to appeal to the Fifth Cir- 
cuit and therefore was not passed upon by that court. Accord- 
ingly, Westvaco provided a poor occasion for passing upon the 
27. Id. at 2-3. 
28. Id. at 4-5. 
29. Id. at 3-4. 
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contribution issue, for it was unlikely that the Supreme Court 
would have recognized a right of contribution against settling 
defendants, particularly where that right would have repre- 
sented a radical departure from existing law which would have 
been retroactively applied to upset legitimate expectations of 
the settling defendants that they had bought their peace.'O 
These concerns became moot, however, when, subsequent to 
the grant of certiorari in Westvaco, the three nonsettling peti- 
tioners themselves settled the actions against them. The Su- 
preme Court then granted respondents' motions to dismiss the 
writ of certiorari on the ground that the circumstances on which 
the petitions had been based were fundamentally altered, and 
because petitioners, as settling defendants, no longer claimed 
that contribution from settlors should be available." As previ- 
ously noted, however, the Court thereupon granted certiorari to 
review the Fifth Circuit's Abraham Construction decision, which 
at this writing is pending before the Court for oral argument and 
decision in the spring of 1981.8a That decision squarely presents 
the antitrust contribution issue free of the complexities engen- 
dered by the immediate presence of settlements. 
The settlement issue cannot be ignored, however, because, 
as I will point out, much of the debate regarding the creation of 
a new right of antitrust contribution centers around its impact 
on the workability and fairness of the antitrust settlement pro- 
cess. Despite its other shortcomings, the Westvaco case at least 
would have had the virtue of focusing the Supreme Court's at- 
tention on that fact. We may hope that the implications of its 
Abraham Construction decision for the settlement process will 
30. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). Moreover, as pointed out in 
the brief of certain respondents in opposition to the petition: 
Petitioners . . . argue the financial hardships faced by several small settling 
defendants who are asserted to be marginally profitable . . . . Yet, it is these 
very same settling defendants who would be most injured by a rule permitting 
contribution. If contribution were permitted, these settling defendants, who, 
according to Petitioners, have been "coerced["] or driven to the edge of bank- 
ruptcy, would be forced to pay just that much more! Thus it is contribution 
which in this context could be used by larger nonsettling defendants as a coer- 
cive anticompetitive device to drive their smaller competitors out of the 
marketplace. 
Brief of Respondents-Plaintiffs in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11 
(footnote omitted). 
31. 49 U.S.L.W. 3288 (Oct. 20, 1980). 
32. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Rad- 
clifFe Materials, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (Oct. 31, 1980). 
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not escape the Court's attention. 
Interest in the antitrust contribution issue has also been 
heightened by proposals for legislation dealing both with the ba- 
sic right of contribution itself and with the corollary of 
mandatory reduction of plaintiffs' claims against nonsettling de- 
fendants on account of damages fairly attributable to the set- 
tling defendants. On July 9, 1979, Senator Bayh introduced S. 
1468, which would provide for the first time a statutory right of 
contribution limited to price-fixing actions only, with the contri- 
bution shares among defendants determined "according to the 
damages attributable to each such person's sales or purchases of 
goods or servi~es."~ Contribution could be asserted on behalf of 
both settling and nonsettling defendants, whether by cross- 
claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim in the original anti- 
trust action, or by separate action after judgment. In accordance 
with the prevailing view, a tortfeasor settling in good faith would 
be discharged from all liability of contribution, but the plain- 
tiffs' claims against the remaining defendants would be automat- 
ically reduced by the greatest of the amount of consideration 
paid for the settlement, the amount stipulated therein, or 
"treble the actual damages attributable to the settling person's 
sales or purchases of goods or servi~es."~ The statute would ap- 
ply prospectively only to actions commenced after the date of its 
enactment. 
The American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law has 
also drafted proposed contribution legislation. Unlike Senator 
Bayh's proposal, it would not be limited to price-fixing actions, 
but would apply to any antitrust violation. The contribution 
share would be determined, not on the basis of the defendants' 
sales or purchases, but instead "in accordance with the relative 
responsibility of each party for the damages awarded in the 
main action."s6 Presumably this contemplates some assessment 
of relative fault as well as impact on the plaintiff. Contribution 
is barred both in favor of and against settling tortfeasors, but 
the plaintiffs rights against the nonsettlors are subject to 
mandatory reduction in accordance with the settlors' contribu- 
tion shares determined in accordance with their "relative re- 
33. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. $ 4I(a) (1979). 
34. Id. $3 4I(b)-~I(c). 
35. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW WITH LECIS- 
 LA^ RECOMMENDATION 11 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF SECTION OF ANTI- 
TRUST LAW]. 
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sponsibility," or, in the alternative, plaintiff may elect to "re- 
move" the settlers' acts from his theory of liability." 
The courts and commentators have identified several pri- 
mary issues of policy relevant to the determination whether to 
recognize -a right of contribution under the antitrust laws. They 
are (1) the impact of such a right on the deterrent effect of the 
private treble damages remedy; (2) the closely related question 
of whether such a right would frustrate the purposes of the con- 
gressionally created treble damage remedy by additionally com- 
plicating antitrust litigation which is already exceedingly com- 
plex, and which imposes a very substantial burden both on 
federal courts and on litigants; (3) the effect of such a right on 
the settlement of antitrust cases; and, (4) the question whether 
considerations of fairness and equity support the creation of a 
right of contribution among antitrust conspirators. None of 
these questions are susceptible of easy resolution. 
A. Deterrence 
In the Professional Beauty Supply decision, which judi- 
cially created a right of contribution under the antitrust laws for 
the first time, the Eighth Circuit majority rejected arguments 
that such a decision would decrease the deterrent effect of the 
private treble damage remedy. The court concluded that "the 
question of deterrence actually cuts both ways and on balance a 
rule allowing conbibution is actually a greater deterrent."s7 The 
panel majority believed that the rule denying contribution nec- 
essarily meant that other coconspirators might go "scot free," 
and stated, "This possibility of escaping all liability might cause 
many to be more willing rather than less willing, to engage in 
wrongful activity."" The majority also noted that a powerful 
and culpable antitrust violator, particularly one that has contin- 
36. The ABA's proposed statute also provides a statute of limitations for contribu- 
tion claims requiring that they be filed within one year of the date of service of original 
complaint or within 60 days after the contribution claimant is on notice of his potential 
liability based on damages caused in whole or in part by the acts or omissions of another, 
or, in any event, within 60 days after the entry of final judgment in the district court. Id. 
at 10. 
37. 594 F.2d at 1185. 
38. Id. 
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uing business dealings with the plaintiff, might be in a position 
to exert its economic influence to ensure that it was never sued, 
thus casting the entire burden of liability on less culpable par- 
ties? In sum, "to deny contribution would be to dilute the de- 
terrent effect of the antitrust laws, since a participant in an anti- 
trust violation could escape all responsibility for its wrong- 
doing. "'O 
Similarly, the Report of the Committee on the Judiciary on 
S. 1468 concluded that there would be no reduction of deter- 
rence through creation of a right to contribution, on the theory 
that "treble damages is a significant penalty, even for a com- 
pany's proportionate share attributable to participation in a 
price-fixing ~onspiracy,"~~ and argued that under the present law 
the biggest and most culpable defendants often obtain dis- 
counted or "bargain" settlements and thus pay much less than 
their fair share of liability." 
There would appear to be little basis logically or empirically 
for the conclusion that creating a right of contribution would en- 
h n c e  the deterrent effect of the private treble damage remedy. 
Although it is true that, after the fact, the rule against contribu- 
tion may permit an antitrust violator who has not been sued by 
an injured plaintiff to escape liability altogether, there would be 
no way for such a defendant to predict that eventuality in ad- 
vance. The deterrent effect of the treble damage remedy must 
be assessed at the time the forbidden conduct is undertaken, not 
with an ex post facto view of where liability ultimately hap- 
pened to come to rest. 
Morever, there is little reason to fear that private, treble 
damage plaintiffs will deliberately exclude large or culpable de- 
fendants from their action, leaving "innocent" small companies 
to bear the entire burden of liability. An injured plaintiff would 
be most likely to select the most culpable and financially respon- 
sible defendant for his lawsuit in order to enhance the chances 
both of a determination of liability and of the ultimate recovery 
of damages? 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. S. FW. NO. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SENATE 
REWRT]. 
42. Id. 
43. See REP~RT OF SECTION OF AN~RusT LAW, supra note 35, at 6. 
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In Abraham Constr~ction,~~ the court concluded, contrary 
to the reasoning of Professional Beauty Supply, that the "very 
possibility of imposition of sole liability has an enhanced deter- 
rent effect."45 The court referred to economic studies tending to 
establish that managers of large organizations are "risk averse" 
and are therefore deterred more by the "slight prospect of a 
large loss than by the strong prospect of a small 1 0 ~ s . " ~ ~  And the 
court recognized that deterrence should be determined before, 
not after the fact: "[Dleterrence does not suffer if contribution is 
denied since a real threat of liability exists for all participants in 
the illegal scheme-any one of them could have been selected as 
the defendant in the plaintiffs action."47 
In his testimony on Senator Bayh's proposed contribution 
legislation, the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Di- 
vision summarized the conflicting empirical possibilities and ex- 
pressed his concern about the impact of a contribution right on 
the workability and deterrent effect of the private treble damage 
remedy: 
Permitting contribution in antitrust cases could have ei- 
ther of two consequences for deterrence resulting from private 
treble damage actions. I t  could increase the deterrent effect by 
making it more likely that all members of an antitrust conspir- 
acy will be sued by somebody-either by the plaintiff or by a 
defendant seeking contribution-or it could decrease the deter- 
rent effect by both lowering each antitrust conspirator's poten- 
tial liability and allowing each conspirator to assess more fully 
in advance his full potential exposure, thereby making the 
cost-benefit analysis of whether to enter into an antitrust viola- 
tion more predictable. I am not able to say that one of these 
possible effects will predominate in all antitrust cases under all 
possible circumstances; nobody could. But I think we should 
44. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979). 
45. Id. at 901. 
46. Id. at 901 n.8. 
47. Id. at  903 n.11. The Abraham Construction majority concluded that even in the 
case of "unintentional" violators of the antitrust laws, the rule denying contribution 
might enhance the deterrent effect of the treble damage remedy because 
even businesses of the purest motives necessarily steer wide of any conduct the 
effects of which may violate the law, in the knowledge that full, trebled dam- 
ages possibly await even an unintentional transgression. Allowing contribution 
may diminish this prophylactic, chilling effect by reducing the threatening 
specter of sole liability. Businesses may be encouraged to risk anticompetitive 
conduct secure in the knowledge that proof of illegal purpose is often impossi- 
ble and that liability for illegal effects will be dissipated. 
Id. at 905. 
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look closely at whether contribution would weaken antitrust 
deterrence where it is needed most, in conspiracies to fix 
prices. 
. . . .  
I think the point here is that I am not certain whether 
conclusions regarding contribution and deterrence developed in 
other areas of the law can be readily applied to all types of 
conspiratorial conduct found in antitrust cases? 
In fashioning a new right of contribution in antitrust cases, 
the Professional Beauty Supply majority relied in part on the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Perma Mufflers v. International 
Parts Gorp.,'@ which held that the common-law defense of in 
pari delicto may not be applied routinely to bar persons injured 
by an antitrust violation from recovery because they have them- 
selves participated in the alleged antitrust v io la t i~n .~~  The Pro- 
fessional Beauty Supply court reasoned that contribution 
should be allowed in antitrust cases because in Perma Mufflers 
"the Supreme Court cautioned against broad application of com- 
mon-law doctrines to prevent recovery if such application will 
defeat important public purpo~es.' '~~ The Professional Beauty 
Supply court was convinced that "the result of automatically 
48. Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Busi- 
ness Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1979) 
(prepared statement of John Shenefield) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. 
Two recent advocates of the judicial creation of a right of contribution have criti- 
cized the view that, ex ante, antitrust deterrence may be increased by the prospect that 
the entire burden of joint and several liability may fall upon a single defendant, on the 
ground that "severity alone has not been accepted as a modern theory of deterrence" 
and that "to the extent that severity of the sanction is important, Congress has deter- 
mined that antitrust sanctions shall be criminal punishments, treble damage actions, eq- 
uitable relief, and attorneys' fees for the successful private plaintiff. . . . Judicial in- 
crease of these severities is gratuitous, and is not justified on a theory of deterrence." 
Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 744 (emphasis added). They argue that they 
"do not accept the notion that the innocent should be oppressed in order that the guilty 
may suffer." Id. at  745. But these observations seem somewhat wide of the problem at 
hand. The question is not one of "judicial increase" of the penalties that Congress has 
provided. The courts have concluded that Congress intended for the traditional rule of 
joint and several liability to be applicable to the private treble damage remedy. Thus, 
the question more appropriately is whether the courts should undertake the process of 
lessening the severity of the remedies that Congress has provided. Similarly, there is no 
question here of oppressing the "innocent." The issue is whether a party who has been 
adjudicated by a jury's verdict to be an antitrust conspirator should be entitled to spread 
his loss among his co-wrongdoers. 
49. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
50. Id. at 138-40. 
51. 594 F.2d at 1185. 
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prohibiting contribution among antitrust defendants . . . would 
be to allow a significant number of antitrust violators to escape 
liability for their wrongdoing and thereby undermine the policy 
of the antitrust laws."52 
This analysis, however, overlooks the fundamental distinc- 
tion between the issue in Perrna Mufflers and the question of 
creation of a right of contribution. In Perrna Mufflers, the plain- 
tiffs were Midas Mufeer dealers who charged in their complaint 
that their franchisor had conspired with its parent corporation 
and other defendants to require the dealers to purchase their 
supplies exclusively from the defendants, to prevent them from 
selling outside designated territories, and to fix resale prices.5s 
There was thus no question that the plaintiffs fell within the 
terms of section 4 of the Clayton Act which provides that "[alny 
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue [to] recover 
three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee."54 An antitrust cocon- 
spirator, however, is not an injured purchaser or consumer of 
goods or services who possesses a cause of action under section 4 
of the Clayton Act.56 It is an antitrust violator whose conduct 
has caused such damages to others. The holding of Perma Muf- 
flers, that the federal courts should not import from other areas 
of the law "broad common-law barriers to relief' to preclude a 
right of action that the Congress has expressly conferred, hardly 
impels the conclusion that the federal courts should import new 
common-law doctrines to create a right of recovery where Con- 
gress has failed to .do so.* 
52. Id. 
53. 392 U.S. at 137. 
54. 15 U.S.C. 8 15 (1976). 
55. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262, 265 (1972). 
56. There is another reason why the Perma Mufflers case provides little support to 
the conclusion that the federal courts should create a general right of contribution in 
antitrust cases. Even if an antitrust coconspirator did possess a right of action under 1 4 
of the Clayton Act, a majority of the court in Perma Mufflers made it clear that an active 
antitrust violator is barred from any recovery under the antitrust laws. Justice Black's 
opinion noted that under the facts of that case, the participation of the plaintiffs in the 
alleged violation through their signature on the Midas Dealer Agreement "was not volun- 
tary in any meaningful sense," 392 U.S. at 139, and that "once it is shown that the 
plaintiff did not aggressively support and further the monopolistic scheme . . . his un- 
derstandable attempts to make the best of a bad situation should not be a ground for 
completely denying him the right to recover which the antitrust acts give him." Id. at 
140 (emphasis added). Justice White's concurring opinion noted that recovery should be 
denied where plaintiff and defendant "bear substantially equal responsibility for injury 
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On balance, the arguments on the deterrence point are in- 
conclusive. As illustrated by the diametrically opposed conclu- 
sions on this issue in Abraham Construction and Professional 
Beauty Supply, the courts that have considered the matter have 
been in no position to determine empirically the effects on anti- 
trust deterrence of continuing the current prohibition against 
contribution or of fashioning a new rule of contribution. And if 
the courts were to create a new right of antitrust contribution, 
they would be in no position to analyze empirically the different 
effects that various possible contribution rules would have. Such 
questions would appear more suitable for resolution by the legis- 
lative than by the judicial process. 
B. Complexity of Antitrust Litigation 
A concern closely related to the deterrence issue in the de- 
bate over creation of a right of antitrust contribution has been 
its impact in making what is already exceedingly complex and 
burdensome litigation even more complex and burdensome. 
Massive antitrust cases have already created problems of judicial 
administration in our federal courts. This has become an era of 
nationwide class actions under Rule 23 in which parties are 
seeking damages aggregating in the millions and even billions of 
dollars. As two commentators have recently noted: 
Private antitrust class action complaints filed on behalf of 
thousands of purchasers, naming as defendants most of the 
manufacturers in an entire industry, have now become com- 
mon. They allege in very general terms that the defendants 
conspired to fix, raise, maintain or stabilize prices; that the 
conspiracy caused injury and damages to the class over a pe- 
resulting to one of them." Id. at 146. Justice Fortas stated that "[ilf the fault of the 
parties is reasonably within the same scale, . . . then the doctrine should bar recovery." 
Id. at  147 (Fortas, J., concurring). Justice Marshall said, "I cannot agree that the public 
interest requires that a plaintiff who has actively sought to bring about illegal restraints 
on competition for his own benefit be permitted to demand redress . . . ." Id. at  151 
(Marshall, J., concurring). And Justices Harlan and Stewart, concurring in part and dis- 
senting in part, concluded that "when a person suffers losses as a result of activities the 
law forbade him to engage in, I see no reason why the law should award him treble 
damages from his fellow offenders." Id. at  154 (emphasis in original). Decisions subse- 
quent to Perma Muflers in the courts of appeals have concluded that only plaintiffs who 
do not bear a substantially equal responsibility for establishing an illegal scheme may 
recover under authority of that decision. See, e-g., Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Miller- 
Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 828 (1970). See also 
South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
402 US. 983 (1971). 
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riod of 10 to 20 years . . . . The damage theory of such com- 
plaints is frequently that defendants' conduct increased prices 
by "X" percent . . . on all sales by all manufacturers in the 
entire industry, including those of nonconspirators. Therefore, 
it is claimed that as the sales of the entire industry were ap- 
proximately $1,000,000,000 a year, the treble damage claim per 
year is $90,000,000 or $900,000,000 for 10 years, and 
$1,800,000,000 for 20 years!57 
such circumstances, litigation is inevitably burdensome and 
drawn out. Discovery is open-ended and expensive. And al- 
though the plight of defendants surely deserves attention, one 
cannot turn a blind eye to the difficulties that the judicial crea- 
tion of a new right of contribution may pose to the accomplish- 
ment of the primary objectives of the private treble damage ac- 
tion, which are to promote compensation for injured victims of 
antitrust violations and to deter those  violation^.^^ 
The potential for further complicating already exceedingly 
complex litigation is raised by Rules 13 and 14 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. If a new rule of contribution is fash- 
ioned under the federal antitrust laws, then defendants seeking 
contribution will routinely file Rule 13 cross-claims, thereby in- 
troducing new issues to be resolved in the action. Moreover, 
Rule 14 provides, 
At any time after commencement of the action a defending 
party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and 
complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action 
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintifh 
claim against him?@ 
Thus, the ability of the plaintiff to select a particularly 
57. Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at  688. 
58. These concerns were recently expressed by the Assistant Attorney General for 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in hearings on Senator Bayh's pro- 
posed contribution legislation. He observed: 
Certainly, we would not want to adopt any rules that could substantially inter- 
fere with the enforcement function presently being performed by private treble 
damage actions. We need to examine any effects contribution may have with 
respect to complexity of antitrust litigation, antitrust deterrence, and incen- 
tives for both plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust cases to settle their dis- 
putes short of litigation. We need to fully appreciate not just the possible ben- 
efits, but also the possible costs, of contribution as a concept in antitrust 
litigation and particularly of the variety of rules and procedures which could 
govern contribution in antitrust litigation. 
Hearings, supra note 48, at  26. 
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). 
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large, financially responsible and culpable defendant or defen- 
dants, and to limit its claim against them, or conversely, to seek 
recovery from a party of approximately equal financial resources 
to its own, would be severely circumscribed by any proposal for 
contribution. The Professional Beauty Supply majority was cog- 
nizant of the danger that allowing contribution might interfere 
with the plaintiffs ability to maintain control of his lawsuit. It 
observed that the 
fear expressed, which is indeed a legitimate one, is that a de- 
fendant may attempt to complicate the issues and confuse the 
jury by impleading numerous third-party defendants or funda- 
mentally alter the lawsuit by impleading a third-party defen- 
dant with financial resources far superior to the plaintiff or the 
original defendante60 
However, the majority concluded that these problems could be 
resolved through the power of the court to sever for separate 
trial the issues raised by any contribution cross-claims or third- 
party ~ornplaints.~~ 
Severing third-party contribution claims for separate trial 
would, however, impose very substantial new burdens on the 
federal courts arising from the basic due process requirement 
that a party may not be subjected to liability as the result of a 
judgment in an action to which he was not a party. Thus, if a 
court should determine to sever third-party defendants for a 
separate trial of the contribution claims, those defendants could 
not be bound by any judgment imposing liability in the original 
action. In order to obtain contribution, the defendants in the 
original action would be forced to undertake a complete retrial 
of the allegations of the original antitrust complaint, this time 
with themselves as plaintiffs, seeking to establish before a new 
jury that they were liable to the original plaintiffs, and that the 
new third-party defendants were jointly liable for the same vio- 
l a t i o n ~ . ~ ~  Moreover, this retrial of the underlying antitrust alle- 
gations would in many cases occur on stale evidence long after 
the expiration of the congressionally prescribed four-year statute 
of limitations for the commencement of the original antitrust ac- 
60. 594 F.2d at 1184 (emphasis added); accord, id. at 1190 (Hanson, J., dissenting in 
part). 
61. Id. 
62. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF TORTS 309 (4th ed. 1971). 
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tion." The prospect of such duplicative retrials of massive and 
complex litigation would deter district courts from using sever- 
ance to remedy the adverse effect of a new contribution right on 
a private plaintiffs control of his action. 
Much the same problem would be created if the defendants 
in the original action choose not to implead others potentially 
liable as coconspirators in order to seek contribution from them 
in the underlying antitrust action, but instead wait until after 
the rendition of judgment and then file an independent action in 
federal district court seeking contribution on account of the 
judgment already entered and paid by them." 
It would be one thing to permit contribution among the de- 
fendants who are all impleaded and parties to the original anti- 
trust action. But the ability of antitrust defendants to maintain 
successive retrials of the original antitrust complaint in an at- 
tempt to spread their losses, whether as a result of a severance 
or the failure of plaintiffs to join some potentially liable parties 
as defendants in the original action, should be a matter for seri- 
ous concern. Nevertheless, as reflected by the provisions of the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, the Uniform 
Comparative Fault Act, and the Restatement, Second, of 
TortaP it is generally accepted in ordinary tort cases that a 
party who has been held liable for damages is entitled to main- 
tain a successive and independent action for contribution, and is 
not required to implead all potential contribution defendants in 
the underlying tort action. That being true, if the federal courts 
were to create a right of contribution among antitrust defen- 
dants as a matter of federal common law, they would no doubt 
be reluctant entirely to preclude such successive actions and to 
require all contribution claims to be resolved together with the 
primary claim, particularly in light of the provisions of the fed- 
eral rules permitting severance and separate trials. 
If a rule permitting successive independent actions for con- 
63. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1976). 
64. Federal jurisdiction over such an action would be based on 28 U.S.C. $9 1331 
and 1337. This was the situation in the Tenth Circuit Olson Farms case, in which Olson, 
having already been held liable for a judgment of over two million dollars, sought contri- 
bution from five alleged coconspirators who it contended had sold some ninety percent of 
the eggs for which it had paid damages, but who had not been named as conspirators in 
the original complaint. 
65. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT 8 3(a) (1955 version); UNIFORM 
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT 8 4(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 886A, Comment i 
(1977). 
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tribution were adopted by the Congress, it would appear a clear 
candidate for the "judicial impact statement" forcefully advo- 
cated by Chief Justice Burger in recent years, for it would thrust 
a whole new category of complex federal litigation on the federal 
courts.66 In this light, it would seem somewhat incongruous for 
the courts on their own initiative to fashion such a new category 
of antitrust litigation as a matter of federal common law. For, as 
the Supreme Court emphasized in Illinois Brick Co. u. Illinois," 
in declining to recognize a right of action on behalf of "indirect" 
purchasers, "considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the 
area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change 
this Court's interpretati~n."~~ The Court cautioned against the 
creation of new rules of liability in the antitrust field that would 
"add whole new dimensions of complexity to treble-damage suits 
and seriously undermine their effectivene~s."~~ 
Persuasive evidence of the potential for unacceptably com- 
plicating antitrust litigation lies in the fact that every district 
judge who has independently considered the question, including 
those sitting on the recent appellate panels, has expressed that 
view. The remarks of the district court in denying motions to 
assert contribution claims in the Westvaco case are typical: 
Further complications to the efficient management of a suit 
such as this would arise from the processing of the many possi- 
ble cross-claims and impleader actions and from the fact that 
joint defense efforts, with their savings in court, staff, and at- 
torney time, would be hindered or deterred altogether. The 
court has recently completed the trial of United States of 
America v. International Paper, et al. and United States of 
America v. Boise Cascade, et al.; those cases involved the pros- 
ecution of nine defendants with well-coordinated joint defense 
efforts. The trial lasted approximately fifteen weeks. It  is diffi- 
cult to judicially foresee how these cases, with the class and 
opt-out plaintiffs and thirty-seven defendants asserting cross- 
claims against each other, could be managed. Liberal use of 
severance would be required for trial, and that would lead to 
the consumption of courts' time in duplicative efforts. It seems 
to the court that a policy of allowing contribution would com- 
plicate litigation procedurally, frustrate settlements, and in- 
66. See Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A. J .  1049, 1050 
(1972). 
67. 431 US. 720 (1977). 
68. Id. at 736. 
69. Id. at 737. 
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hibit joint defense efforts to such an extent that this type of 
litigation would be virtually impossible to manage.'O 
C. The Effect of Contribution on Settlement 
One of the most difficult questions posed by any contribu- 
tion rule is the effect it would have on the workability and fair- 
ness of the settlement process in antitrust litigation. These ques- 
tions arise in the context of determining whether contribution 
should be allowed both against an alleged antitrust violator who 
has settled with the plaintiff, and in favor of such a settling de- 
fendant, and if so, in what circumstances. 
1. Contribution against settling antitrust defendants 
The history of judicial and legislative efforts to deal with 
the thorny question of contribution against settling defendants 
is a tortuous one. Under the 1939 version of the Uniform Contri- 
bution Among Tortfeasors Act, the plaintiffs claim against non- 
settling defendants was reduced only by the amount of the set- 
tlement or the amount stipulated in the settlement, but the 
settlor was not relieved from liability for contribution to nonset- 
tling defendants unless the settlement provided for a reduction 
of damages recoverable against the other tortfeasors in an 
amount equal to the settler's pro rata share." That provision 
was subject to substantial criticism, however. 
The idea underlying the 1939 provision was that the plaintiff 
should not be permitted to release one tortfeasor from his fair 
share of liability and mulct another instead, from motives of 
sympathy or spite . . . and that the release from contribution 
affords too much opportunity for collusion between the plain- 
tiff and the released tortfeasor against the one not released.?* 
However, reports from states in which the Act was adopted "ap- 
pear to agree that it has accomplished nothing in preventing col- 
lusion" and "[tlhe effect of Section 5 of the 1939 Act has been to 
discourage settlements in joint tort cases, by making it impossi- 
70. Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. C, at 3, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract 
Co., 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980). 
71. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT $5 4-5 (1939 version). The 
"pro rata" share was determined by dividing the total judgment by the number of 
tortfeasors. 
72. Id. 8 4, Commissioners' comment on subsection (b) (1955 version). 
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ble for one tortfeasor alone to take a release and close the file."73 
This was said to result from the fact that "no defendant wants 
to settle when he remains open to contribution in an uncertain 
amount, to be determined on the basis of a judgment against 
another in a suit to which he will not be a party."74 
Accordingly, the Act was amended in 1955 to provide that a 
good faith settlement completely discharged a settling tortfeasor 
from liability for contribution, even if the settlement did not 
provide for a pro rata reduction of the damages that might be 
collected from other defendants? The commissioners for the 
1955 Act expressed the view that it was "more important not to 
discourage settlements than to make an attempt of doubtful ef- 
fectiveness to prevent discrimination by plaintiffs, or collusion 
in the 
As indicated, however, the 1955 rule was subject to question 
on the ground that it might lead to collusive settlements, and 
because it appeared to be inconsistent with the primary equita- 
ble objectives of the right of contribution. For this reason, a 
number of common-law courts adopted the view, mainly in the 
context of fashioning subsidiary rules within the framework of a 
state contribution statute, that settlement should discharge a 
settling tortfeasor from all liability for contribution, but that the 
plaintiffs claim against the other potential defendants should be 
reduced in the amount of the settlor's "pro rata share" of 
damages.'' 
With few exceptions, courts adopting some variant of the 
pro rata reduction rule in the exercise of their law-making power 
have operated within the framework of a statutory contribution 
scheme enacted by a state legislature; such decisions do not nec- 
essarily suggest complete judicial freedom to fashion new rights 
of contribution in the absence of legislative guidance. An excep- 
tion, however, is Gomes v. Brodhur~t,'~ in which the court of 
appeals, in a negligence case arising under the law of the Virgin 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. $ 4 (1955 version). 
76. Id. Commissioners' comment on subsection (b). 
77. See generally Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 486 
(1966). There is a substantial question whether under the "pro rata reduction" rule the 
settlor's "pro rata" share by which plaintiffs claims against the other defendants is di- 
minished should be measured on a "per capita," proportionate fault, or market share 
basis. 
78. 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1968). 
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Islands, adopted a form of the pro rata reduction rule as a corol- 
lary to its conclusion that the courts of the Virgin Islands, if 
presented with the question, would permit a right of contribu- 
tion among joint tortfeasors in the absence of contribution legis- 
lati~n. '~ The primary impetus for the court's dictum on the con- 
tribution issue thus arose from the perceived necessity to 
insulate settling tort defendants from contribution to other de- 
fendants subsequently held liable to the plaintiff. The court rea- 
soned that "voluntary settlements are to be encouraged and a 
rule permitting contribution under such circumstances would 
not work to that end" because the defendant would "have a pos- 
itive incentive to stand trial and actively participate in his de- 
fense in order to minimize his liability."80 In the court's view, 
only a pro rata reduction rule would ensure an "equitable distri- 
bution of liablity for joint fault and yet [encourage] out-of-court 
~ettlements."~~ 
If a rule of contribution were adopted either by statute or as 
a matter of federal common law under the antitrust laws, then it 
would seem to follow either that the nonsettling defendants 
should be entitled to contribution against the settlors as pro- 
vided by the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors 
Act, or, in the alternative, if such contribution were precluded, 
that there should be a mandatory claim reduction in some 
amount calculated to remove a fair portion of liability attributa- 
ble to the settlors from the case. It would be logically inconsis- 
tent to recognize a right of contribution in nonsettlement cases, 
but to preserve a settling plaintiffs full right of recovery against 
nonsettlors without any right of contribution against the settling 
defendants. Indeed, a primary impetus for the introduction of S. 
1468 providing for contribution in price-fixing cases was the 
view that some form of claim reduction is desirable in the settle- 
ment context because existing law creates unfair "settlement 
pressure" against nonsettling defendants, particularly in large 
79. Id. at 467-68. 
80. Id. at 468. 
81. Id. The court declined, however, to adopt a rule automatically reducing the 
plaintiffs claim on a "per capita" basis, depending on the ratio of the number of settling 
tortfeasors to the total number of tortfeasors involved, in favor of a reduction based on 
"the extent of [the] negligence." The court believed that the "fairness of such a system is 
evident," but it was troubled by whether "its implementation will serve to encourage or 
discourage settlement prior to trial" because "a plaintiff, unable to know with any cer- 
tainty before verdict the extent of his recovery, will be reluctant to discharge one or 
more of several tortfeasors from liability." Id. at 468-69. 
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class action antitrust litigation in which potential damages can 
run into the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars.s8 It 
is claimed that because only the settlement amount is carved out 
of ultimate recovery against nonsettling defendants under ex- 
isting rules, the "exposure" of the nonsettlors increases with 
each settlement, thereby increasing the pressure on nonsettlors. 
Plaintiffs' counsel are said to demand a certain amount per per- 
centage point of market share, which they escalate with each 
successive settlement round without regard to the merits of their 
claims against any particular settling defendant.83 In the view of 
the proponents of S. 1468, 
the effect of this open-ended liability on a smaller defendant 
who wishes to defend its innocence is to drive it into settle- 
ment, even if it believes that the risk of its being found liable is 
small. .. . . 
The result is to allow plaintiff's counsel to settle relatively 
inexpensively with . . . some defendants (usually the large and 
most responsible or those who want out as quickly as possible) 
and force the remaining defendants (often those who have the 
best case or are in the poorest financial position-usually the 
smaller companies) to settle at a higher rate rather than run 
the risk of huge liability for not only their own damages but 
also for the damages of those who opted out early and cheaply. 
S. 1468 will end the abuse of these "whipsaw tactics" by 
relieving a defendant of the liability attributable to the defen- 
dants who setl.@' 
To the extent that it exists, the existence of such "settle- 
ment pressure'' would appear to be primarily attributable to the 
basic rule of joint and several liability of each antitrust conspira- 
tor for all damages caused by the conspiracy. Mandatory claim 
reduction seems inconsistent with that principle, for it requires a 
pro rata reduction of recovery rights no matter how small a part 
of his damages a plaintiff obtains in settlement. Morever, the 
empirical evidence on this alleged strategy is far from conclu- 
82. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at 2-3, 13-17, 19. 
83. [A] plaintiff's settlement strategy is often implemented by announcing that 
a "discount" will be given to quick settlors, based on the multiplication of an 
arbitrary dollar figure per "market share" by the defendant's share of sales. 
Once the initial settlements are achieved, the price of later settlements in- 
creases, because the number of remaining defendants decreases with each 
settlement. 
Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 689-90. 
84. SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at 2. 
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sive. Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy in their supplemental 
views on S. 1468 noted that "the availability of contribution may 
well reduce the risk of damage liability for businessmen consid- 
ering entering a price-fixing conspira~y,"~~ that "as a general 
rule, contribution is denied to intentional  wrongdoer^,"^^ that 
"mandatory claim reduction represents a step back from the 
long-established principle of joint and several liability,'"' and 
that in their view, 
We have been presented with absolutely no evidence that 
the larger, more "culpable" defendants routinely settle price- 
fixing suits early in the litigation. Neither have we seen any 
evidence demonstrating that small defendants are ultimately 
forced to settle against their will for unreasonable amounts be- 
cause of earlier settlements by larger  defendant^.^^ 
85. Id. at  31. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at  36. 
88. Id. at  37 (footnote omitted). The primary example of alleged unfair settlement 
pressure or "coercion" advanced by proponents of S. 1468 was that of the Green Bay 
Packaging Company, named as a defendant in the Corrugated class-action litigation. Ac- 
cording to the hearings testimony, Green Bay Packaging had a net worth of approxi- 
mately $70,000,000, annual sales of $125,000,000, almost 1,800 employees, and an after 
tax net income of $8.5 million in 1977. It manufactured corrugated boxes and had ap- 
proximately 1.5 percent of the sales of the industry. Following a federal grand jury inves- 
tigation of alleged price-fixing in the industry, a grand jury returned a number of indict- 
ments. Green Bay Packaging was not indicted. 
In the hearings on S. 1468, the chairman of the board of the company claimed that 
"none of our employees were named as co-conspirators by the Justice Department attor- 
neys conducting the criminal trial." Hearings, supra note 48, at 33. He testified that 
although a number of companies, including some of those indicted, settled early in the 
civil proceedings for relatively low amounts per percentage point of market share, Green 
Bay Packaging initially determined that there was no reason to settle because it was 
innocent. It was not until over 80 percent of the defendants in the private treble damage 
action had entered into settlements with the class plaintiffs that Green Bay first realized 
that it was facing a potential damage exposure for the sales of the entire industry. At 
that juncture, however, the plaintiffs declined to settle except on terms more onerous 
than those offered to companies that had bought their peace early in the litigation. 
Green Bay determined that the risk of liability was too great and threatened to impair 
its credit standing, and therefore that it could not afford to litigate its innocence. Id. at  
32-39. 
The facts relating to the Green Bay settlement are subject to dispute. One of plain- 
tiffs' counsel in the Corrugated litigation advised the subcommittee that although Green 
Bay Packaging itself was not indicted, it "was named as a co-conspirator in the Bill of 
Particulars filed by the Justice Department in the criminal litigation" and "[e]leven of 
its officers and employees . . . were also named by the government as co-conspirators." 
Id. at  188-89. He also pointed out that Green Bay was among the last of the defendants 
to settle, that it was not required to pay cash as had the other settling defendants, but a 
promissory note payable two years later, and that Green Bay had paid significantly less 
than a number of defendants that had settled earlier and less, indeed, than the average 
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It seems unlikely that plaintiffs' counsel would deliberately 
pursue a strategy of settling with larger, more culpable, and 
more financially responsible defendants at bargain rates in order 
that they might preserve their claims against innocent defen- 
dants who would be unable to discharge a jury verdict against 
them in any event. The more serious concern is that the settle- 
ment strategy employed by plaintiffs' counsel has operated in 
practice to permit larger and more culpable defendants to settle 
early, leaving smaller and innocent ones facing liability for an 
entire industry in a nationwide class action suit as a result. 
Whether this has in fact been the case is an empirical matter 
peculiarly subject to legislative, rather than judicial deter- 
mination. 
There is, morever, another perspective that raises a basic 
question whether the adoption of any claim reduction rule in the 
antitrust field as a corollary to a right of contribution among 
antitrust defendants would be consistent with the deterrence 
and compensation objectives of the private treble damage rem- 
edy. One view suggests that the modern class action has created 
a form of "legalized blackmail" that unfairly disadvantages anti- 
trust and other class-action defendants. And indeed, if it were 
generally true that plaintiffs use "whipsaw" settlement tactics to 
force antitrust defendants to settle for reasons unrelated to the 
merits of the case, there would be reason for serious concern. 
Others believe, however, that antitrust litigation, involving as it 
does complex issues, extensive discovery, and defendants with 
substantial financial resources, which in many cases may out- 
weigh those of any single plaintiff, may become a "war of attri- 
tion" in which the defendants may ultimately avoid any judicial 
determination of liability by taxing the plaintiffs' resources to 
the point that they are willing to settle for an amount far below 
their potential damage recovery. From this perspective, class-ac- 
tion antitrust litigation has merely served to redress the balance 
of power between the plaintiffs and defendants in complex liti- 
gation. These differing viewpoints were sharply reflected in the 
hearings on S. 1468, with representatives of 'the defense bar 
strongly advocating the legislative creation of a right of contri- 
bution in price-fixing cases, and representatives of the plaintiffs' 
settlement amount. Id. at 189-90. It also appeared that Green Bay Packaging's liability 
for contribution in favor of the settling defendants, had S. 1468 been the law and had it 
chosen not to settle, would have exceeded the amount it paid in settlement of plaintiffs' 
claims. Id. at 190. 
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bar stridently opposing it.89 
The issues of settlement and contribution under the anti- 
trust laws must be viewed in this larger context. Thus, although 
current rules of liability may in some cases lead to unfair settle- 
ment pressure, the ability of antitrust plaintiffs to obtain early 
settlements with some defendants may provide them with the 
resources necessary to continue the lawsuit against the others.90 
In addition, the settlement process provides plaintiffs with an 
avenue of obtaining meaningful recovery commensurate with the 
defendants' fault short of full-scale litigation. Their ability to 
circumvent long, burdensome, and expensive litigation not only 
significantly benefits the judicial system, but also may enhance 
the deterrent effect of the private treble damage remedy. But 
under a regime of mandatory claim reduction, the incentive of 
plaintiffs to enter such settlements would be reduced because 
they would be surrendering an undetermined but potentially sig- 
nificant part of their claim against the other defendants. As Sen- 
ators Kennedy and Metzenbaum observed in their Supplemental 
Views on S. 1468: 
S. 1468 substantially reduces the plaintiffs' incentive to 
settle early in the litigation at  an amount which the small com- 
pany with a large market share can afford. Under the law as it 
now stands, the individual liabilities of the nonsettling price- 
fixers is reduced only by the amount of the plaintiffs' settle- 
ment with the small company unless the plaintiffs agree to a 
larger deduction. S. 1468, however, forces the plaintiffs to give 
up a part of their claim which may far exceed any amount that 
the small company can reasonably afford. As Mr. Shapiro 
pointed out [in the hearings], "No plaintiff in his right mind is 
going to settle with a defendant with a small net worth and a 
large market share if by so doing he is going to take 30 or 40 or 
50 percent of the market out of the case." . . . And Mr. 
Shenefield [Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division] ob- 
served that "even defendants who desperately want to reach a 
compromise settlement may find plaintiffs reluctant to enter 
into settlement agreements from fear of losing an unknown 
portion of their potential recovery?" 
In an earlier review of this subject, the author concluded 
89. Compare Hearings, supra note 48, at 63-87, 110-22 with id. at 49-63, 91-110. 
90. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at 40 (supplemental views of Senators Met- 
zenbaum and Kennedy). 
91. Id. at 38. 
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that in the context of ordinary negligence litigation, the pro rata 
reduction rule offered the best resolution of competing policies 
because, although it might discourage partial settlements of liti- 
gation, it would not undermine the most relevant settlement 
goal of encouraging entirety of settlement?' Although partial 
settlements may be "an economic way of life, often yielding high 
rewards" to the plaintiffs' bar:" such settlements do not prevent 
actions against the others and "the adjudicative system may 
thus be burdened with the case whenever the settlement is not 
entire. A greater economy is apparent when the plaintiff settles 
his entire cause of action by negotiating collectively with all the 
tortfeasors, and entirety is therefore the more desirable settle- 
ment goal."" Nonetheless, in the antitrust field, the private 
treble damage remedy serves an important deterrent as well as 
compensatory function, and it is imperative that the rules 
adopted not undermine the effectiveness of this remedy as a 
practical matter by unduly diminishing the bargaining power of 
plaintiffs versus antitrust defendants. And unless significant 
pressure for partial settlement exists, entirety of settlement may 
be only a hypothetical possibility. 
If a contribution rule were created under the antitrust laws, 
coupled with mandatory claim reduction, a number of difficult 
subsidiary questions would remain, primarily concerning how 
the mandatory reduction should be computed. As the impetus 
for contribution rests primarily on the ground of "fairness" 
among wrongdoers, i t  would seem to follow that some form of 
comparative fault analysis should provide the general rule." But 
this would interject yet another exceedingly complex factual de- 
termination, the allocation of fault among the violators, into an- 
titrust litigation either in the initial action or in a subsequent 
independent suit for contribution. Moreover, contribution on the 
basis of comparative fault has been criticized on the ground that 
it would deter both plaintiffs and defendants from set- 
tling-plaintiffs because, despite the settlement, they would be 
forced to litigate the fault of the settling defendants in their ac- 
tion against the nonsettlors; and defendants because they would 
92. See Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 486, 488-89, 493 
(1967). 
93. Id. at 489. 
94. Id. 
95. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT 5 4. See also United States v. Reliable 
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). 
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be unable to avoid the judicial determination of their liability, in 
an action to which they were not parties, that might encourage 
other potential lawsuits.* 
In the Professional Beauty Supply case, the majority of the 
court adopted "a rule of pro rata contribution except in unusual 
~ircumstances"@~ because of "the administrative difficulties of 
assessing exact percentages of fault in complicated antitrust ac- 
tions" and because the court believed that "a rule of pro rata 
contribution will serve as a more effective deterrent to antitrust 
~iolations."~~ But this analysis would seem itself to disregard 
what the Professional Beauty Supply majority declared to be 
the "deciding factor" in its decision, namely "fairness between 
the parties."@@ If the "pro rata share" be determined, as the Pro- 
fessional Beauty Supply majority apparently assumed, on a 
"per capita" basis, then obviously the contribution share would 
bear no necessary or even close relationship either to the fault or 
to the economic benefits realized by the contribution defendant. 
This difficulty could be ameliorated to some degree by determin- 
ing the "pro rata share" on the basis of the market share of the 
settling defendant or by the "actual damages attributable to the 
settling person's sales or purchases of goods or services" as pro- 
posed in s. 1468, but again, these measures, although perhap8 
proportionate to the "benefits" supposedly realized by the con- 
spirator, bear no necessary relationship to its fault and degree of 
involvement in the conspiracy, which would seem to be neces- 
sary considerations in any rule grounded primaily on considera- 
tions of fairness. 
2. Contribution on behalf of settling antitrust defendants 
An issue generally ignored in the commentary is whether 
contribution should be available in favor of an antitrust violator 
that has voluntarily settled the action against it without any ju- 
dicial determination of its liablity. This is the situation in a 
companion to the Tenth Circuit Olson Farms case, in which the 
original antitrust plaintiffs had commenced a "follow-on" action 
against Olson, seeking damages for the alleged continuation of 
96. See Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1540, 
1555 (1980). 
97. 594 F.2d at 1182 n.4. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 1185. 
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the conspiracy for which they had previously recovered judg- 
ment. Olson filed cross-claims against the other defendants in 
the follow-on action, and a third-party complaint against an al- 
leged coconspirator not named as a defendant by the plaintiffs. 
The district court dismissed Olson's cross-claims and a third- 
party complaint.loO Following the entry of judgment, however, 
Olson Farms settled the action of the antitrust plaintiffs against 
it with the result that it avoided any judicial determination of 
its liability. Olson nonetheless maintained on appeal that it was 
entitled to contribution on account of the settlement amount 
that it had negotiated with the plaintiffs, both against other al- 
leged coconspirators who themselves had settled with the anti- 
trust plaintiffs, and against the third-party defendant, who had 
not.lol 
Although a minority of state statutes do not permit contri- 
bution unless a joint judgment has been entered against the al- 
leged tortfeasors,lo2 the prevailing view expressed by the Uni- 
form Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act is that contribution is 
available on account of a settlement payment.lo3 There is sub- 
stantial reason to question whether this rule, which arose in neg- 
ligence actions, should be uncritically extended to the antitrust 
area even if a right of contribution otherwise existed. As illus- 
trated by the second Okon case, such a rule would mean that 
even though the only plaintiff possessing a cause of action under 
section 4 of the Clayton Act had entirely settled an antitrust ac- 
tion against the defendants, thereby removing the burden of the 
action from the federal courts, an antitrust conspirator who vol- 
untarily entered such a settlement would nevertheless be per- 
mitted to assume the garb of a plaintiff and maintain a contri- 
bution action based on the same allegations. Moreover, because 
no judicial determination of liability was ever made in the un- 
derlying antitrust action against the settling defendant, it would 
be necessary, despite the settlement, for the settling defendant 
as contribution plaints to litigate the entire antitrust case, 
proving with competent evidence both that it was liable in fact 
100. Cackling Acres v. Olson Ftlrms, Inc., No. C-75-472 (D. Utah Dec. 19, 1977) (or- 
der dismissing cross-claims and third-party complaint). 
101. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Countryside Farms, Inc., No. 78-1773 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 
1979). 
102. See generally Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. 
Supp. 1339, 1343 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); W. PROSSER, supra note 62, at 308-09. 
103. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT $ 1(a) (1955 version). 
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to the antitrust plaintiff and that the alleged contribution defen- 
dants were its co~onspirators.~~~ The contribution plaintiff would 
also be required to prove that the amount of its settlement was 
reasonable in light of its potential damage exposure and the risk 
of an adverse jury verdict,lo5 an exceedingly difficult process 
under any  circumstance^.^^^ 
D. "Fairness" Among Antitrust Violators: The Relevance of 
Intent 
A primary impetus for creating a right of contribution 
under the antitrust laws has arisen from allegations that existing 
rules of joint and several liability create "unfair settlement pres- 
sure." As previously discussed, resolution of this argument turns 
primarily on empirical determinations and legislative policy 
judgments. In addition, however, advocates of contribution have 
contended that even in a litigated case, considerations of fair- 
ness favor creation of a right of contribution and outweigh 
whatever harm might arise from the standpoint of decreasing 
deterrence, discouraging settlement, or increasing the complex- 
ity of antitrust litigation. The Professional Beauty Supply ma- 
jority stated that "the deciding factor in our decision is fairness 
between the parties" and that "[tlhere is an obvious lack of 
sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire buden of 
restitution of a loss for which two parties are responsible to be 
placed upon one alone because of the plaintiffs whim or spite, 
104. "[A] compromiser must sustain the burden of proof. . . as to his own liability 
to the original plaintiff' and "the contribution defendant must be a tortfeasor, and origi- 
nally liable to the plaintiff." W. PROSSER, SUPM note 62, at 309. See, e.g., W. D. Rubright 
Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (Penn- 
sylvania statute). 
105. See W. PROSSER, supra note 62, at 309. 
106. The district court in the contribution action would also be forced to determine 
whether the release of the contribution plaintiff had the effect of releasing all of the 
alleged contribution defendants from liability to the plaintiffs. If the settlement did not 
have that effect, it is generally accepted that the contribution plaintiff conferred no 
"benefit" on the alleged contribution defendants sufficient to entitle it to force them to 
share the amount of its settlement. See, e.g., Allbright Bros., Contractors v. Hull-Dobbs 
Co., 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953) (Arkansas statute); Brenham v. Southern Pacific Co., 
328 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1971) (Louisiana statute), aff'd, 469 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1061 (1972); UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS 
ACT, $ l(d) (1955 version); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 719 (1956). 
Whether the release had that effect is a matter of federal law which requires a detailed 
inquiry into the intent of the parties. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 
U.S. 321, 342-47 (1971). 
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or his collusion with the other wrongdoer."lo7 
This language should be contrasted with that of Professor 
Prosser, its unacknowledged source, who more accurately states 
the shared community perception of equity among wrongdoers. 
What Prosser actually said was: 
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which 
permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants 
were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered 
onto one alone, according to the accident of . . . the plaintiffs 
whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer 
. . . . 
108 
Beginning with the Restatement of Restitution in 1937, and 
carrying on through the 1939 and 1955 versions of the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, the 1977 Uniform Com- 
parative Fault Act, and the Restatement, Second, of Torts, it 
has been generally accepted, even in jurisdictions permitting 
contribution by statute, that considerations of fairness do not 
require permitting an intentional wrongdoer to relieve himself of 
a portion of the damages for which he is otherwise jointly and 
severally responsible. For example, section l(c) of the 1955 Uni- 
form Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides: "There is 
no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has inten- 
tionally . . . caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful 
death."loB The Restatement, Second, of Torts provides: "There 
is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has 
intentionally caused the harm."llo The comments to the Re- 
statement note that "contribution is a remedy that developed in 
equity"lll and that 
[IJn the absence of statute, the courts have adhered to the 
original English rule that no right of contribution arises in 
favor of one who has intentionally caused harm to another. 
The basis of the rule is the old one that the courts will not aid 
one who has deliberately done harm, so that no man can be 
permitted to found a cause of action on his own intentional 
tort.llg 
107. 594 F.2d at 1185-86. 
108. W. FROSSER, supra note 62, at 307 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
109. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT 8 1(c) (1955 version). 
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 886A(3) (1977). 
111. Id. Comment c. 
112. Id. Comment j (emphasis added). The Restatement notes that the rule "has 
been modified . . . to permit contribution in favor of one who is charged with a purely 
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The Restatement applies the same rule to reckless conduct, 
which "usually approaches the degree of moral blame attached 
to intentional harm, since the defendant deliberately inflicts a 
highly unreasonable risk of harm upon others in conscious disre- 
gard of it."llS In the brief amicus curiae for the United States 
urging the grant of certiorari in the Westvaco case, the Solicitor 
General recognized that the considerations of equity and fair- 
ness that have prompted state legislatures to enact statutes pro- 
viding for apportionment of damages in negligence cases cannot 
be transported to require such apportionment among antitrust 
conspirators.l14 
In the face of these strong expressions that contribution is 
inappropriate in the case of intentional wrongdoers, advocates of 
contribution have urged that most antitrust violations do not in- 
volve intent to cause harm of a nature that would preclude the 
assistance of a court of equity,"' to the extent of contending 
that "[elven in cases of so-called per se liability, intent to cause 
harm is not necessary for the violation" and that "[a] principle 
excluding contribution, based on intent to cause harm, would 
. . . allow contribution in most antitrust cases."lle 
This analysis is subject to serious question. Conspiracies 
and attempts to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sher- 
man Act require a finding of a specific intent to monopolize as a 
precondition of liability.l17 This was the situation in the Tenth 
Circuit Okon Farms case, for example, in which Olson, which 
sought contribution, had been subjected to liability in the un- 
technical tort" such as "one who has become liable for conversion by reason of his bona 
fide purchase of stolen goods . . . ." Id. This qualification would not appear to be rele- 
vant to the question of contribution in favor of an antitrust conspirator. 
113. Id. Comment k. Similarly, the Commissioners' Comment to the Uniform Com- 
parative Fault Act (apparently not yet adopted by any state) points out that "[tlhe Act 
does not include intentional torts." 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, Comment to 8 1 (1980 
Supp.). Some proponents of contribution have apparently overlooked this limitation. See 
Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at  738, 750 & n.185. 
114. "While we recognize that contribution arguably may enhance fairness in some 
circumstances, we do not regard as in itself unfair the principle of joint and several lia- 
bility for the consequences of concerted intentional misconductwhich is the general 
rule for both criminal and tort liability in our legal system." Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae at  15, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980). 
115. E.g., Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 751. 
116. Id. a t  752-53. 
117. Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., Buick Motor Div., 517 F.2d 567,576 (10th 
Cir. 1975) ("specific intent to monopolize is the heart of a conspiracy charge"); REPORT 
OF SECTION ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 35, at  59-63 (1979); E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST 
PRIMER 108-09 (2d ed. 1973). 
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derlying antitrust action on the basis of evidence of blatant an- 
ticompetitive conduct.l18 Moreover, beyond antitrust violations 
requiring a finding of specific intent, a wide range of the most 
prevalent private treble damage actions allege per se violations 
of the antitrust laws such as price fixing. To argue that "[tlhe 
parties to such conduct . . . may not intend to cause harm"119 
disregards the nature of the per se antitrust violation. There is 
no analogy between such conduct, which under accepted norms 
of commercial behavior does carry with it substantial moral tur- 
pitude, and technical violations of a statute such as "driving at a 
speed in excess of the statutory limit or parking next to a fire 
plug"120 in which contribution may be appropriate. 
In United States u. United States Gypsum Co.,lal the 
United States Supreme Court considered the state of mind re- 
quired to sustain a criminal violation of the antitrust laws. Gyp- 
sum did not involve a per se violation of the antitrust laws such 
as an agreement to fix prices, but an agreement within the "rule 
of reason" to exchange price information, allegedly for the pur- 
pose of assuring compliance with the "meeting competition" de- 
fense of section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Supreme 
Court held that proof of a criminal violation of the antitrust 
118. As the court of appeals stated in affirming the judgment against Olson on ac- 
count of which contribution was sought: 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs did not rely on price parallelism alone to 
prove that Olson Farms and its alleged conspirators forced downward the price 
paid to Utah-Idaho egg producers. There was other evidence, which the jury 
apparently chose to believe, that representatives of Olson Farms and its co- 
conspirators had numerous meetings a t  Harman's Cafe, and that in addition 
thereto, there were constant telephone calls between the various conspirators, 
all in furtherance of the conspiracy to peg egg prices in the Utah-Idaho area. 
Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242, 245 (10th Cir. 1976). 
The trial court had instructed the jury that it could find Olson Farms liable as a 
conspirator only if it determined that Olson had intentionally entered into a conspiracy 
to fix prices: "[A]cceptance of [an agreement to restrain trade] must be conscious and 
intentional"; and "it must be shown that .  . . the members [of the conspiracy] came to a 
mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan." Record at 7366-67. 
The trial court further instructed on plaintiffs' conspiracy to monopolize claim that the 
Cackling Acres plaintiffs were required to prove that Olson conspired "with the specific 
intent . . . to acquire or exercise monopoly power." Id. a t  7379 (emphasis added). See 
also id. a t  7383, 7387-88. Judge Holloway, although dissenting from the Tenth Circuit's 
denial of contribution in the Olson Farms case, acknowledged: "I agree that a t  this junc- 
ture Olson Farms must be considered an intentional wrongdoer" and that "we must re- 
gard Olson Farms as an intentional wrongdoer since conspiracy and attempt [to monopo- 
lize] both require a finding of specific intent." 1979-2 Trade Cas. at 79,706 n.3. 
119. Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, a t  752. 
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 886A, Comment j (1977). 
121. 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
1831 ANTITRUST CONTRIBUTION 215 
laws requires evidence that the illegal agreement was taken ei- 
ther with the specific intent of producing anticompetitive ef- 
fects, or with knowledge that such effects were substantially cer- 
tain to occur, for "[iln either circumstance, the defendants are 
consciously behaving in a way the law prohibits, and such con- 
duct is a fitting object of criminal p~nishment."'~~ The Court 
appeared to draw a distinction between criminal violations, 
which require such proof of "mens rea," and civil violations, 
which do not.lag 
Gypsum suggests that some rule of reason violations may 
indeed expose conspirators to civil liability even though they 
thought they were doing nothing wrong and had no intent to 
cause harm. Such an analysis has no applicability to a conspir- 
acy to fix prices or to commit some other per se violation of the 
antitrust laws. As pointed out in a leading post-Gypsum deci- 
sion, "the mere existence of a price-fixing agreement establishes 
a defendant's illegal purpose."124 Thus, in order to sustain a 
criminal conviction for price fixing, no proof of intent, beyond 
the intent to fix prices, is required."' 
The Supreme Court's concern [in Gypsum] with those who 
unwittingly violate the antitrust laws has no place here. Here, 
defendants have fixed prices, "probably the clearest violation 
of the antitrust laws and the one most obnoxious to the under- 
lying policy of free competition." The act of agreeing to fix 
prices is in itself illegal, the criminal act is the agreement.lS6 
The possibility remains that the interests of fairness would 
require the fashioning of a contribution rule that would permit 
contribution to "unintentional" antitrust violators while denying 
it to those who commit per se violations of the antitrust laws or 
act with the specific intent to restrain trade. In the OZson Farms 
case, the Tenth Circuit suggested the possibility of an exception 
in the case of an "unintentional violator."la7 In the Abraham 
Construction case, however, the Fifth Circuit majority declined 
to endorse such a distinction on the grounds that it would open 
122. Id. at 445. 
123. Id. at 443 n.19. 
124. United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 1979). 
125. Id. (footnote omitted). Accord, United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 
F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 
1101 (7th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979). 
126. 599 F.2d at 545. 
127. 1979-2 Trade Cas. at 79,704. 
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a "Pandora's box'' of procedural complexities and could impair 
the deterrent function of the private treble damage remedy.128 
Even assuming that inequity may occur in a particular case 
. . . we believe that creating a contribution right for an unin- 
tentional violator may inimically affect the implementation of 
.the antitrust laws. The possible detriments that can be envi- 
sioned make this an inappropriate case for the exercise of our 
power to shape the federal common law.12e 
Although the argument for contribution based on fairness in 
the case of a truly unintentional violator-if such a case were to 
arise-is not without substance, it is of interest to note, in as- 
sessing the prevalence of this situation, that all four of the lead- 
ing decisions on this question in the courts of appeals (Profes- 
sional Beauty Supply, Abraham Construction, Westvaco, and 
Olson Farms) involved allegations of a conspiracy to fix prices, 
or violations requiring a finding of specific intent, or both. It is 
also clear that making the availability of contribution contingent 
on the absence of intent would add substantial additional com- 
plications to already exceedingly complex private treble damage 
actions by creating a major issue regarding the state of mind and 
degree of culpability of the various defendants.lS0 Morever, such 
a rule would necessarily create considerable uncertainty about 
when contribution might be available, thus undermining the cer- 
tainty necessary to make rational settlement decisions.1s1 
129. Id. at 905. 
130. See Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1540, 
1555-56 (1980). 
131. The Professional Beauty Supply majority was also influenced by allegations in 
National's third-party complaint that La Maur had solicited National to become its dis- 
tributor and that National had no responsibility for La Maur's decision to terminate the 
plaintiff. 594 F.2d at 1181. The court of appeals noted the possibility that a "large or 
powerful tortfeasor" with "sufficient economic influence to prevent a plaintiff from in- 
cluding it as a defendant" could escape liability entirely. Id. at 1185. Similarly, Judge 
Holloway dissenting in the Tenth Circuit's decision in Olson Farms, although acknowl- 
edging that the "record . . . does not deal with the motives and circumstances of the 
bringing of this antitrust suit" pointed out the possibility of "a plaintiff deliberately 
choosing to sue a less formidable, but financially responsible defendant, and avoiding 
litigation with other equally culpable parties." 1979-2 Trade Cas. at  79,706. There is 
little if any empirical evidence to support such conjecture, and such a strategy would 
appear in the ordinary case to be counter to the incentive of a private plaintiff to include 
those defendants most culpable and most financially responsible in its action. 
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A. Contribution in Negligence and Securities Act Cases 
The Professional Beauty Supply majority and other advo- 
cates of contribution have emphasized a perceived "trend" to- 
ward the allowance of contribution among joint wrongdoers in 
support of their suggestion that a new right of contribution 
should be fashioned under the antitrust laws.lS2 Although such a 
"trend" undoubtedly exists, closer analysis of the circumstances 
in which it has manifested itself is required if it is to be placed 
in perspective and its limitations understood. 
Proponents of contribution have relied on a small minority 
of decisions that have judicially implied a right of contribution 
among joint tortfeasors in negligence cases.1ss With one excep- 
tion,lS4 those decisions arose under state law, and thus did not 
purport to call into question the long-standing rule of the Union 
Stock Yards case denying a right of contribution as a matter of 
federal common law. More fundamentally, the cases cited were 
all negligence cases. This limitation is explicit in the case going 
furthest to fashion a new judicial rule of contribution as a mat- 
ter of federal common law, Kohr u. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.lS6 
Kohr involved consolidated wrongful death and property dam- 
age suits arising out of a mid-air collision that were commenced 
under diversity and Federal Tort Claims Act jurisdiction. Defen- 
dants United States and Allegheny settled and then sought con- 
tribution and indemnity from the other defendants. The district 
court ruled that, under the applicable law of Indiana, no such 
right of contribution existed. The court of appeals reversed on 
. 
the ground that the district court had erred in applying Indiana 
law to the cross-claims and third-party complaints for indemnity 
and contribution, and instead held that "there should be a fed- 
eral law of contribution and indemnity governing mid-air colli- 
sions such as the one here" because of the "predominant, indeed 
132. 594 F.2d at 1184. See also Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 749; RE- 
PORT OF SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 35, at 4-5; SENATE REPORT, supra note 
41, at 4-9. 
133. See e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Gomes v. Broadhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967); Knell v. 
Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
134. See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400, 401 (7th Cir. 1974). 
135. 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974). 
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almost exclusive, interest of the federal government in regulat- 
ing the affairs of the nation's airways."lM The court's holding 
was expressly limited to the fashioning of a rule permitting con- 
tribution and indemnity among unintentional wrongdoers: 
We reject as being outmoded and entirely unsatisfactory, the 
contention that the federal rule should be one of "no contribu- 
tion." We agree that "[tlhere is an obvious lack of sense and 
justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for 
which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsi- 
ble, to be shouldered on to one alone . . . . ,9187 
Considerations of fairness and equity are far clearer in the 
negligence area than in the case of antitrust violations. Morever, 
the development of rights and remedies in negligence actions 
has long been the peculiar province of common-law courts, save 
only as their creativeness may be restrained by legislative enact- 
ment. In contrast, the prescription of rights and remedies under 
the antitrust laws has fundamentally been the province of Con- 
gress, and the judiciary must therefore exercise its law-making 
powers with some care to avoid undercutting the primary legis- 
lative policies expressed by the statutory remedial scheme of the 
antitrust laws.lS8 
Proponents of contribution have also relied upon decisions 
permitting contribution among joint violators of the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even where 
the violations were intentional.lS9 They argue that such decisions 
"granted contribution rights even under sections of the Securi- 
ties Act which did not contain explicit provisions for such 
rights."140 The Professional Beauty Supply majority cited a 
136. Id. at 403. In view of the settled principle that state substantive law applies 
both in diversity actions and in actions arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act, one 
might question the court's holding as a matter of substantive law. 
137. Id. at 405 (emphasis added). 
138. Some commentators have also noted that in England the common-law rule, un- 
like the rule of the Union Stock Yards case in the United States, denied contribution 
only to willful or conscious wrongdoers, and that by virtue of the Law Reform (Married 
Women and Tortfeasors) Act of 1935 even that limitation is no longer applied, and con- 
tribution is permitted among joint tortfeasors "where damage is suffered by any person 
as a result of a tort (whether a crime or not)." Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 
736-37 (quoting 25-26 Geo. 5, c. 30 (1935); SALMOND ON TORTS 445 (17th ed. 1977)). 
There has been no corresponding statutory expansion of rights of contribution in the 
United States. 
139. See generally, SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at  7-9; REPORT OF SECTION OF 
m u m  LAW, supra note 35, at 4-5; Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 742-43. 
140. Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 742 (footnote omitted). 
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number of the securities act cases in support of its conclusion 
that "federal courts have been willing to formulate rules for con- 
tribution in other areas of the law without express congressional 
direction."141 
This analysis overlooks the fact that several sections of the 
securities acts in which Congress created an express private 
right of action for damages also include a provision for contribu- 
tion among defendants without regard to their culpability. For 
example, section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides: "All 
or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) of 
this section shall be jointly and severally liable, and every per- 
son who becomes liable to make any payment under this section 
may recover contribution . . . Substantially identical lan- 
guage appears in the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 dealing with the manipulation of security prices14' and 
misleading statements.lu There are no comparable provisions 
expressly authorizing contribution among defendants held 
jointly liable for violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex- 
change Act of 1934 and section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
1933, but the reason for this is obvious: Congress provided no 
express private right of action for damages under such provi- 
sions. Not having done so, it could hardly be expected to have 
authorized contribution with respect to a remedy that it did not 
create. The courts would appear to have been on solid ground as 
a matter of congressional intent and legal process in determining 
that in such cases where securities act damage liability to pri- 
vate parties was judicially implied, a right of contribution should 
be permitted by analogy to those express private rights of action 
that the Congress did create."" 
B. Contribution in Admiralty Cases 
The need for caution against uncritical extension "by anal- 
ogy" of decisions in other areas of the law, which are concerned 
with other questions, and involve different policy considerations, 
is also illustrated by the admiralty cases cited by proponents of 
the judicial creation of a right of contribution under the anti- 
141. 594 F.2d at 1184 (footnote omitted). 
142. 15 U.S.C. 5 77k(f) (1976). 
143. Id. 5 78i(e). 
144. Id. 5 78r(b). 
145. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968). 
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trust laws. Notwithstanding the settled rule of the Union Stock 
Yards case, which denies any right of contribution as a matter of 
federal common law, federal courts sitting in admiralty have 
from the beginning followed a rule permitting contribution in 
maritime cases. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & 
Refitting Corp.,14@ the United States Supreme Court pointed out 
that 
Where two vessels collide due to the fault of both, it is 
established admiralty doctrine that the mutual wrongdoers 
shall share equally the damages sustained by each, as well as 
personal injury and property damage inflicted on innocent 
third parties. This maritime rule is of ancient origin and has 
been 'applied in many cases . . . . 147 
The Court made clear that this "admiralty doctrine of an- 
cient lineage"148 was distinct from the general federal common- 
law rule denying contribution among wrongdoers: "In the ab- 
sence of legislation, courts exercising a common-law jurisdiction 
have generally held that they cannot on their own initiative cre- 
ate an enforceable right of contribution as between joint 
tortfeasors." [citing the Union Stock Yards case].149 Noting that 
the common-law rule had provoked both criticism and defense, 
the Court observed in Halcyon that "to some extent courts exer- 
cising jurisdiction in maritime affairs have felt freer than com- 
mon-law courts in fashioning rules, and we would feel free to do 
so here if wholly convinced that it would best serve the ends of 
justice."lM In the circumstances of Halcyon, however, the court 
declined to permit a right of contribution. 
Halcyon Lines had hired Haenn Ship Corporation to repair 
Halcyon's ship. Haenn's employee was injured on the ship while 
making the repairs, and the employee sued Halcyon, claiming 
that his injuries were caused by its negligence and the unseawor- 
thiness of its vessel. Halcyon sought contribution from Haenn. 
The jury concluded that Haenn was 75 percent responsible and 
Halcyon 25 percent responsible. Under the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Haenn was liable without 
fault to its employee for his injuries. The Act further provided 
146. 342 U.S. 282 (1952). 
147. Id. at 284 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
148. Cooper Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 110 (1974). 
149. 342 U.S. at 285 (citing Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 196 
U.S. 217, 224 (1905)). 
150. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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that "the liability of an employer prescribed . . . shall be exclu- 
sive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the 
employee . . . at law or in admiralty on account of such injury 
or death . . . ."Iu Haenn had argued that the Harbor Workers' 
Act provided its exclusive liability, "thereby preventing a third 
party from having any right of contribution against an employer 
under the Act in cases where the joint negligence of a third 
party and the employer injure an employee covered by the 
Act."lS2 The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide this 
question because it concluded on independent grounds that "it 
would be unwise to attempt to fashion new judicial rules of con- 
tribution and that the solution of this problem should await con- 
gressional action. "lSa 
The bases for the Supreme Court's conclusion were (1) that 
Congress had pre-empted the question of rights and remedies in 
the area of maritime personal injuries in non-collision cases by 
enacting a complex system of statutes in the area, and (2) that 
the questions presented were not within the judicial competence. 
The Court stated: 
Congress has already enacted much legislation in the area of 
maritime personal injuries. For example, under the Harbor 
Workers' Act Congress has made fault unimportant . . .; Con- 
gress has made further inroads on traditional court law by abo- 
. lition of the defenses of contributory negligence and assump- 
tion of risk . . . . The Harbor Workers' Act in turn must be 
integrated with other acts such as the Jones Act . . . . Many 
groups of persons with varying interests are vitally concerned 
with the proper functioning and administration of all  these 
Acts as an integrated whole. We think that legislative consider- 
ation and action can best bring about a fair accomodation of 
the diverse but related interests of these groups. The legislative 
process is peculiarly adapted to determine which of the many 
possible solutions to this problem would be most beneficial in 
the long run.lM 
Advocates of the creation of a right of contribution under 
the antitrust laws have contended that Halcyon was "in effect 
confined . . . to cases where the extension of the admiralty rule 
would conflict with a clearly expressed statutory rule making an- 
151. Id. at 286 n.12. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 285. 
154. Id. at 285-86 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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other remedy excl~sive""~ by the later decision of the Supreme 
Court in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, I ~ C . ' ~ ~  In that
action, a vessel owned by Kopke was loaded by petitioner 
Cooper Stevedoring Company in Mobile, Alabama, and then 
proceeded to Houston where another stevedore was employed to 
load additional cargo. A Houston longshoreman engaged in this 
task fell between a gap in the crates that had been loaded in 
Mobile and injured himself. He sued the vessel in admiralty and 
the vessel in turn sought recovery over from Cooper alleging that 
any negligence or unseaworthiness was the result of its activities. 
The district court concluded that the loading of the original 
cargo had created an unseaworthy condition and that Cooper 
had been negligent. Accordingly, the court divided damages 
equally between the vessel and Cooper. The United States Su- 
preme Court rejected Cooper's contention based on Halcyon 
that there could be no award of contribution against it. It ob- 
served that "despite the occasional breadth of its dictum"157 the 
Halcyon opinion should be read against the historical backdrop 
of the "admiralty doctrine of ancient lineage" which "provides 
that the mutual wrongdoers shall share equally in damages sus- 
tained by each."'58 The Cooper Court noted that "since the em- 
ployee [in Halcyon] was covered by the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act . . . he was prohibited from 
suing his employer Haenn."lm It was the Cooper Court's view 
that the Halcyon Court 
took cognizance of the apparent trade-off in the Act between 
the employer's limitation of liability and the abrogation in 
favor of the employee of common-law doctrines of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk. . . . Confronted with the 
possibility that any workable rule of contribution might be in- 
consistent with the balance struck by Congress in the Harbor 
Workers' Act between the interests of carriers, employers, em- 
ployees, and their respective insurers, we refrained from al- 
lowing contribution in the circumstances of that case.160 
In contrast, the employee in Cooper was not an employee either 
of the vessel or of Cooper, and "on the facts of this case, then, 
155. Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 740. 
156. 417 U.S. 106 (1974). 
157. Id. at 111. 
158. Id. at 110. 
159. Id. at 111. 
160. Id. at 112. 
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. . . no countervailing considerations detract from the well-es- 
tablished maritime rule allowing contribution between joint 
tortfeasors."lsl 
It is going too far to say that after Cooper, Halcyon means 
only that federal courts should refrain on their own initiative 
from creating common-law rights of contribution in cases in 
which Congress has expressly legislated a statutory immunity. 
Cooper rested fundamentally on the historic maritime doctrine 
permitting contribution, and held that in an admiralty case rest- 
ing on allegations of unseaworthiness and negligence, it saw no 
reason to depart from that "well-established maritime rule al- 
lowing contribution between joint tortfeasors" absent some indi- 
cation of inconsistency with the policies underlying legislation in 
the area.ls2 
In the context of the antitrust laws, however, the question is 
not whether a court should depart from a well-established rule 
permitting contribution, but whether it should adhere to the 
long-standing federal common-law rule denying contribution in 
the absence of legislation on the question, and moreover, 
whether it should do so in a context where arguments based on 
the principle of fairness are far from compelling and turn in sig- 
nificant part on empirical and legislative facts. In addition, there 
is substantial reason to question whether the existence of such a 
right would be consistent with the deterrence and compensation 
objectives underlying the private treble damage remedy. In that 
context, the Halcyon Court's concerns about upsetting the bal- 
ance among competing interests established by Congress and its 
conclusion "that the legislative process is peculiarly adapted to 
determine which of the many possible solutions to this problem 
would be most beneficial in the long run" has continuing 
relevance. lsS 
161. Id. at 113 (emphasis added). 
162. Id. 
163. In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975), the Supreme 
Court abrogated the traditional admiralty rule of equal division of damages in maritime 
collision cases, initially announced over 120 years before. The respondent had urged that 
"creation of a new rule of damages in maritime collision cases is a task for Congress and 
not for this Court." Id. at 409 (footnote omitted). The Court responded, "the Judiciary 
has traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law mcrr- 
itime, and Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the 
controlling rules of admiralty law.' "Id. (emphasis added). Reliable Transfer was thus a 
case in which the Court exercised its recognized primacy as lawgiver in a field in which 
the development of remedial law had traditionally been the province of the courts, to 
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C. The Relevance of Cases Dealing with the Implication of 
Private Rights of Action for Damages 
In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California,lW the Supreme 
Court considered whether section 4 of the Clayton Act author- 
ized a state to sue for damages for injuries to its "general econ- 
omy" allegedly attributable to violations of the antitrust laws. It 
concluded that such authorization did not exist. After reviewing 
the history of actions by states as parens patriae on behalf of 
their citizens,166 the Court pointed out that " [t] he question in 
this case is not whether Hawaii may maintain its lawsuit on be- 
half of its citizens, but rather whether the injury for which it 
seeks to recover is compensable under # 4 of the Clayton Act."166 
It held that it was not because the injury claimed was not to the 
"business or property" of the state within the meaning of section 
4 and thus did not fall within the language of the congressional 
remedial grant, which provides: 
At the very least, if the latter type of injury [to the state's 
economy] is to be compensable under the antitrust laws, we 
should insist upon a clear expression of a congressional pur- 
pose to make it so, and no such expression is to be found in 8 4 
of the Clayton Act?" 
To recognize a right of antitrust contribution would be to go well 
beyond the express rights of action for damages that Congress 
has provided in section 4 of the Clayton Act and to fashion a 
new private right of action in favor, not of a person injured in 
his business and property, but of a conspirator whose conduct 
has caused such injury. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has, where a 
abrogate a rule that it itself had announced in an earlier decision, in circumstances 
where the rule had met with almost uniform condemnation and the United States was 
the only major maritime nation in which it continued to be followed. Far different con- 
siderations apply under the statutory scheme of the antitrust laws. Cf. Edmonds v. 
Campagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979), which declined to extend the 
Reliable Transfer principle of division of damages based on comparative fault to an ac- 
tion by an injured longshoreman against a shipowner, on the ground that "here we deal 
with an interface of statutory and judge-made law." 443 U.S. at  272. Although the Ed- 
monds court was concerned primarily with possible impairment of congressional reliance 
on an existing rule, its analysis equally counsels caution in creating new common law 
rights that could impair the policies underlying remedies that Congress has provided. 
164. 405 U.S. 251 (1972). 
165. Id. a t  257-59. 
166. Id. at  259. 
167. Id. a t  264. 
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right of action is based on an alleged constitutional violation, 
freely implied a private damage remedy,168 it has been much 
more restrictive where the construction of a statute is involved. 
In Davis v. P a s ~ m a n , l ~ ~  the Court pointed out that "the ques- 
tion of who may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally dif- 
ferent from the question of who may enforce a right that is pro- 
tected by the Constitution." Furthermore, the Court stated that 
"statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, 
and it is entirely appropriate for Congress, in creating these 
rights and obligations, to determine in addition who may enforce 
them and in what manner."170 In Cort v. Ash,171 the Supreme 
Court, in the course of an opinion holding that there was no pri- 
vate damage remedy against corporate directors under a crimi- 
nal statute prohibiting certain political contributions, articu- 
lated the now familiar four-part standard for the implication of 
a private right of action: 
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial bene- 
fit the statute was enacted" . . . . Second, is there any indica- 
tion of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create 
such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with 
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such 
a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And finally, is the cause of ac- 
tion one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basi- 
cally the concern of the States . . . . 178 
Even if all of the very serious doubts concerning whether 
allowing a right of contribution would be "consistent with the 
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme" could be resolved, 
an attempt to imply such a right under the Cort standards 
would normally flounder because the proposed contribution 
plaintiff would not be "one of the class for whose especial bene- 
fit the statute was enacted."17" To the extent that the impetus to 
168. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 100 S.Ct 1468 (1980) (eighth amendment); Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (damage action based on sex discrimination in violation of 
the fifth amendment); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcot- 
ics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment). 
169. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
170. Id. a t  241 (emphasis in original). 
171. 422 US. 66 (1975). 
172. Id. a t  78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
173. One may question whether the flexible Cort analysis does not state a considera- 
bly more liberal view on the propriety of implying a private damage remedy than is 
presently held by a majority of the Court. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 
560 (1979), for example, the Court held that customers of brokerage firms required to file 
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recognize a right of contribution under the antitrust laws rests 
on a perceived need for additional "deterrence" to further the 
"private attorney general" objective of the treble damage rem- 
edy, these decisions would appear to be controlling. On the other 
hand, much of the impetus for the implication of a right of con- 
tribution under the antitrust laws rests on a perception of the 
need to assure "fairness between the parties." In this context, 
the Cort analysis is not fully applicable, for the question is not 
one of judicially implying a remedy as an adjunct of a primary 
duty already statutorily prescribed, but of whether the judiciary 
should, in the first instance, imply an underlying primary duty 
among wrongdoers themselves. 
In Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union,17' the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit implicitly 
recognized the limited utility of the Cort analysis in the contri- 
bution context, holding that the "first prong" of the Cort test 
(whether the plaintiff was "one of the class for whose especial 
benefit the statute was enacted") was inapposite.175 The plain- 
tiff, representing a class of Northwest's female cabin attendants, 
recovered damages against the airline employer for violations of 
the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
certain financial reports with regulatory agencies had no implied private right of action 
for damages based upon misstatements in such reports. Justice Rehnquist for the Court 
noted that "once again, we are called upon to decide whether a private remedy is implicit 
in a statute not expressly providing one. During this Term alone, we have been asked to 
undertake this task no fewer than five times in cases in which we have granted certio- 
rari." Id. at 562 (footnote omitted). The message of caution to the courts of appeals is 
unmistakable. Reversing the court of appeals which had implied such a right of action 
upon the basis of Cort v. Ash, Justice Rehnquist admonished, inter a h ,  that "implying 
a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, a t  
best" and that 
where, as here, the plain language of the [statute] weighs against implication of 
a private remedy, the fact that there is no suggestion whatsoever in the legisla- 
tive history that 17(a) may give rise to suits for damages reinforces our deci- 
sion not to find such a right of action implicit within the section. 
Id. a t  571-72. Moreover, he noted that the statutory provision question was "flanked by 
provisions of the 1934 Act that explicitly grant private causes of action . . . . Obviously, 
then, when Congress wished to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so 
and did so expressly." Id. In conclusion, "the central inquiry remains whether Congress 
intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action." Id. a t  
575. 
174. 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct 3008 (June 16, 1980). 
The Supreme Court directed that Northwest Airlines be set for argument in tandem 
with the Westvaco case. As previously noted, the writ of certiorari in Westvaco has now 
been dismissed. 
175. Id. at 1354. 
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of 1964.1T6 After the entry of judgment, Northwest commenced a 
separate action against the bargaining representatives of its em- 
ployees alleging that the discrimination in question had resulted 
from the collective bargaining agreement between Northwest 
and the unions.lT7 The district court held that there was no right 
of contribution under the Equal Pay Act, but that the federal 
common law provided a basis for a claim of contribution under 
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1T8 
The court of appeals afhmed as to the Equal Pay Act. The 
court reasoned that the existence of a right of contribution 
should turn on whether the plaintiff in the underlying action 
could have held either of the two defendants liable, in which 
case a right of contribution would normally be recognized, but 
that "if, on the other hand, one of the defendants is protected 
from suit by the plaintiff, it will also [generally] be protected 
from contr ibut i~n."~~~ Because Congress had explicitly provided 
for a private right of action for damages against the employer 
but not the union under the Equal Pay Act, the court of appeals 
concluded that "this statutory protection would certainly be 
frustrated by a declaration that an employer could recover from 
a union, once that employer had been found liable to its 
employees. "180 
Thus, the deciding factor for the court of appeals in North- 
west was the "third prong of the Cort test-consistency with the 
legislative scheme."181 As previously suggested in this article, the 
consistency of a contribution right with the compensation and 
deterrence objectives of the private treble damage remedy under 
the antitrust laws is open to very serious doubt. 
D. The Interstitial Lawmaking Role of the Judiciary under 
the Antitrust Laws 
In the Professional Beauty Supply case, the Eighth Circuit 
observed that: 
the antitrust statutes are not purported to be comprehensive 
176. Id. at 1352. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 1352-53. 
179. Id. at 1354. 
180. Id. at 1355. The court of appeals declined to reach the question of contribution 
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but remanded for consideration of the 
union's defense based on laches. Id. at 1356. 
181. Id. at 1355. 
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and, possibly as a result, courts have not been prone to await 
congressional action to resolve many of the questions left un- 
answered by these statutes, such as the nature of the cause of 
action, apportionment of judgments, assignment, survival and 
 limitation^.'^^ 
It is of course true that the federal courts have done much 
to fill in the interstices of the antitrust laws, both as to their 
substantive meaning and as to procedural detail. As the Su- 
preme Court recently observed in United States Gypsum Co., 
the Sherman Act, does not "precisely identify" the conduct 
which it proscribes, but contains "generalized definitions" of the 
conduct prohibited.'= Liability is determined with reference to 
"open-ended and fact-specific standards like the 'rule of rea- 
son' " and the Act "has been construed to have a 'generality and 
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in consti- 
tutional provisions.' "IM For this reason, 
The Sherman Act may be seen not as a prohibition of any 
specific conduct but as a general authority to do what common 
law courts usually do: to use certain customary techniques of 
judicial reasoning, to consider the reasoning and results of 
other common law courts, and to develop, refine, and innovate 
in the dynamic common law tradition.lS6 
Both the broad terms and the legislative history of the 
Sherman Act support the implication of a broad delegation of 
Congressional authority to the judiciary to define the substan- 
tive reach of that Act. No such implied delegation may fairly be 
read into the detailed legislative prescription of antitrust 
remedies. 
Federal courts have also necessarily had to resolve questions 
of procedural detail under the antitrust laws absent any express 
congressional guidance. Such judicial law-making is illustrated 
by Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,la6 in which 
the Supreme Court adopted as a matter of federal common law 
the rule that the release of one tortfeasor should not be held to 
release the others unless it was intended to do The Court 
182. 594 F.2d at 1183. 
183. 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978). 
184. Id. at 438-39 (quoting Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 
359-60 (1933)). 
185. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 46 (2d ed. 1974). 
186. 401 U.S. 321 (1971). 
187. Id. at 342-46. 
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declined to follow the "ancient common-law rule" that a release 
of one released all others jointly liable regardless of intent be- 
cause it viewed a rule adhering to the intent of the parties as the 
"most consistent with the aims and purposes of the treble-dam- 
age remedy under the antitrust laws."1B8 
As the Zenith Court implicitly recognized, the federal 
courts would be abdicating the judicial function if they were to 
take the position that they could give no answers to the myriads 
of procedural issues that arise in the course of the administra- 
tion of the antitrust laws except those with which Congress 
failed to deal. For this reason, the courts have perceived that 
even though the basic outlines and policies of those laws, both 
substantive and procedural, must be resolved in the first in- 
stance by Congress, the judicial branch must be free to work out 
the details in the individual case to comport, to the best of their 
ability, with the aims and purposes of the antitrust laws and 
remedies that Congress has provided. To acknowledge that gen- 
eral role, however, does little to resolve the specific issue under 
consideration which is whether, applying "customary techniques 
of judicial reasoning" and having an eye to the "aims and pur- 
poses of the treble-damage remedy," the courts should depart 
from the existing common law to fashion a new right of contri- - 
bution. In Zenith, proper policy from the standpoint of equity 
bas apparent to the Court; there was no argument that the rule 
adopted concerning the effect of a release of one of several anti- 
trust conspirators might undermine the effectiveness of the pri- 
vate treble damage remedy. Resolution of the antitrust contribu- 
tion issue is much more difficult. 
For essentially the same reasons, the recent decision of the 
Third Circuit in Glus v. G. C. Murphy Co.,lBe fashioning a fed- 
eral common law right of contribution in favor of an employer 
held liable for sex discrimination in violation of title VII against 
the unions that had agreed to the terms of an allegedly illegal 
collective bargaining agreement, is not persuasive authority for 
judicial creation of a right of contribution under the federal an- 
titrust laws. Although there is no reason to gainsay that court's 
recognition of the ability of federal courts to fashion law within 
the interstices of a statutory scheme in appropriate circurn- 
stances, none of the authorities cited in Glus dealt with situa- 
188. Id. at 346. 
189. 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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tions closely analogous to that under consideration here. Thus, 
the antitrust contribution question is not one of fashioning a 
private right of action to enforce a primary statutory duty where 
the appropriate legislative materials indicate that such private 
enforcement would effectuate congressional intent? It is one of 
creating the primary duty itself where there is no suggestion of 
any congressional intent to do so. Nor does the question involve 
an implied delegation of judicial lawmaking authority such as 
that determined by the United States Supreme Court to be im- 
plicit in the broad jurisdictional grant that was the subject of 
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,lQ1 or in the substantive 
prohibitions of the antitrust laws themselves. This is not a case 
of a broadly phrased grant of jurisdictional or substantive 
power, but of the absence of any such delegation. 
The Glus court recognized that it would be inappropriate, 
in any case, to fashion a contribution right unless it could at 
least be concluded that such a right would implement congres- 
sional intent.lQ2 In Glus, the court of appeals believed that the 
express terms of title VII "reflect a statutory policy that the re- 
sponsibility for monetary relief should be borne by both unions 
and employers to the extent that they are responsible for viola- 
tions of Title VII,"lW and further that a right of contribution 
would promote the conciliation objectives of the Act.lQ4 In con- 
trast, the courts have construed the liability provisions of the 
Clayton Act to embody the historic princple of joint and several 
liability, by which any one of several coconspirators may be held 
liable for all damages caused by the conspiracy, and a contribu- 
tion right would raise severe impediments to settlement in anti- 
trust actions. It is also significant that violations of title VII may 
be based entirely on discriminatory impact without any showing 
of intent to dis~riminate,'~~ whereas many prevalent violations 
of the antitrust laws such as price-fixing do involve intentional 
and culpable misconduct as to which an equitable right of con- 
tribution would be inapproriate. 
There is, in sum, no basis on which to conclude that a right 
of contribution would effectuate, and substantial reason to be- 
190. See id. at 255. 
191. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
192. 629 F.2d at 255. 
193. Id. at 256 (emphasis added). 
194. Id. 
195. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976). 
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lieve that it could impair, the congressional purposes underlying 
the private, treble-damage remedy in antitrust cases? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is inappropriate to expect Congress to resolve every prob- 
lem of substantive and procedural detail that arises under the 
antitrust laws or any scheme of statutory liability. Therefore, it 
is generally recognized that the federal judiciary has an impor- 
tant role in fashioning federal common law where the terms of 
the governing statute are silent. But the exercise of that role, 
with its potential for impairing the primary policies that Con- 
gress has prescribed, calls for a more cautious and discriminat- 
ing approach to the raw materials of judicial decision than was 
adopted by the majority opinion in the Professional Beauty 
Supply case. 
In arguing for a right of contribution based on considera- 
tions of "fairness," the Professional Beauty court should have 
given greater weight to the fact that the existing federal common 
law denies any general right of contribution, and that contribu- 
tion rights, whether of legislative or judicial origin, have arisen 
primarily in the areas of negligence or unseaworthiness, areas 
which do not provide an apt analogy to antitrust violations. 
There has been no general recognition that considerations of 
fairness and justice require that intentional wrongdoers such as 
antitrust price-fixers be entitled to spread their losses. 
A court should also bear in mind that perhaps the strongest 
impetus for recognition of a right of antitrust contribution is the 
claim that the existing statutory provision of joint and several 
liability, particularly in the class action context, by creating 
multi-million dollar damage exposure, creates "unfair settlement 
196. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), cited by the Glus majority, 
629 F.2d at  253, the primary issue was whether federal rather than state law should be 
applied in resolving a claim that the pollution of interstate waters had created a public 
nuisance. The Court's conclusion that federal law should apply was based on prior cases 
within its original jurisdiction dealing with water disputes between states, in which the 
application of the law of either of the contending states would have been inappropriate. 
Id. at  101-07. There was no claim that the application of public nuisance princples would 
be inconsistent with federal statutes in the area. To the contrary, the Court concluded 
that such actions were within a savings clause of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act. Id. at 104. 
In contrast, there is no dispute that the antitrust contribution issue must be gov- 
erned by federal rather than state law. But there are very substantial reasons to question 
whether abandoning the long-standing federal common-law rule precluding contribution 
would undermine the remedies that Congress has provided in the antitrust laws. 
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pressure," and that the judiciary should guard against this al- 
leged pressure by creating a species of "mandatory claim reduc- 
tion" as a corollary of an underlying contribution right. Such 
claim reduction, however, would seem inconsistent with the joint 
and several liability that Congress has provided. And of equal 
importance, the validity of the argument that unfair settlement 
pressure is a serious problem turns largely on questions of em- 
pirical fact and legislative policy judgments which the federal 
courts are ill equipped to make. 
In addition, it would be inappropriate for a court to fashion 
a new right of contribution under the antitrust laws as a matter 
of federal common law unless it were able to say with considera- 
bly more assurance than would appear to be warranted that 
such a right would not be inconsistent with the primary deter- 
rent and compensatory policies underlying the private, treble- 
damage remedy that Congress has expressly provided. 
